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A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING: THE RANSOM-MONTGOMERY YEARS
ON THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT
Michael B. Browde & Mario E. Occhialino*

INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court has had many distinguished justices who
stood out among their colleagues. Occasionally, the Court’s history has been graced
by the coming together of two or three justices who, while working together,
provided a special mix of respectful differing views and philosophies that enhanced
the Court’s development of the law, the public’s better understanding of the judicial
process, and the special role of the judiciary in our system of government.
Justice Richard Ransom and Justice Seth Montgomery were one such team.
Justice Ransom served on the court from 1987 until his retirement in 1997.1 He
served on the five-member high Court with twelve different fellow justices,2 many
of whom were distinguished in their own right. When, however, Justice Seth
Montgomery joined the Court in 1989,3 something special occurred. The power of
Justice Montgomery’s intellect and his well-crafted opinions seemed to spark a
special relationship between the two, which led the authors to pursue this opportunity
to explore that relationship and its influence on the development of the law. Their
collaboration greatly enhanced the development of New Mexico law.

*

Michael and Ted are graduates of Georgetown University School of Law where each was first introduced
to the Palsgraf case by the superb Torts professor, Professor Thomas O’Toole. They found their way
through different routes to the UNM School of Law faculty under the leadership of former Dean Fred
Hart, whose inspiration and memory they cherish. Michael and Ted are now Emeriti faculty at the law
school.
The authors express their gratitude to Justice Ransom who kindly offered his encouragement and
assistance to their efforts, and to attorney Andy Montgomery who helpfully reviewed earlier drafts and
also tracked down the papers of his dad, Justice Montgomery, in the bowels of the New Mexico Supreme
Court library. Those papers were kindly made available to the authors by Clerk of the Court Joey Moya.
The authors also thank Dean Sergio Pareja for a research grant that allowed them to hire law student
Lawson Stiff, who provided valuable research work on the article. Elisa Cibils deserves special thanks
for shepherding the article through the editorial process, as do Law Review editors Kathryn Sears and
Alyssa Segura.
1. Justice Ransom sat on the Court from January 1, 1987, through February 7, 1997. See Free Law
Project, Richard E. Ransom (New Mexico Supreme Court), CT. LISTENER (Apr. 23, 2022),
https://www.courtlistener.com/person/5167/richard-e-ransom/.
2. The justices were: Dan Sosa Jr., Harry E. Stowers Jr., Mary C. Walters, Tony Scarborough,
Joseph F. Baca, Charles B. Larrabee, Kenneth B. Wilson, Gene E. Franchini, Stanley F. Frost, Pamela B.
Minzner, Dan A. McKinnon III, and Patricio M. Serna. Details on terms of their service can be found on
the Court Listener Website. See id.
3. Justice Montgomery sat on the Court from September 5, 1989, through October 27, 1994. See
Free Law Project, Seth D. Montgomery (New Mexico Supreme Court), CT. LISTENER (Apr. 23, 2022),
https://www.courtlistener.com/person/5162/seth-d-montgomery/.
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Justice Montgomery served for only five years with Justice Ransom before
his premature resignation for health reasons in 1994. Although there is much in their
written opinions upon which they agreed, Justice Montgomery often provided an
alternative vision of the law from that of Justice Ransom. Their differing
jurisprudential approaches and perspectives did not preclude efforts to accommodate
each other, but when that was not possible, they did not engage in angry dissents or
sharp criticism of the other’s views. Instead, when they wrote separately and
disagreed, they did so with clear statements of their differing views and usually with
an acknowledgement of and warm respect for the other person’s perspective—a
special mode of collegial decision-making worthy of description and further analysis
for the ways in which it advanced the law and laid the groundwork for further legal
development.
After first providing brief biographies of the justices and their personal
relationship, the article examines two subject matter areas where their differing
views were most fully developed and made a significant contribution to the
development of the law:
First, the restructuring of the law of negligence with an emphasis
on the creation and nature of a duty of care; and
Second, the legal principles governing the jurisdiction of the New
Mexico appellate courts and the resulting tension between legislative and judicial
authority over provisions governing access to the appellate courts.
The article concludes with our assessment that sound judicial development
of the law often is a product of the interplay between justices of different legal
philosophies, who may disagree profoundly on some significant issues, but who
respect and learn from the views of one another. Such was their relationship, and
New Mexico law is better because these two jurists shared service on the New
Mexico Supreme Court, leaving a body of work that resolved many questions and,
when agreement was not possible, provided a sound foundation for their successors
to continue to refine New Mexico law.
I.

THE PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE JUSTICES AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Richard Ransom and Seth Montgomery were only casual acquaintances
when they came to the Court. Though they were men of a similar generation, they
were molded by different backgrounds and different professional experiences.
1.

Richard E. Ransom4

Justice Ransom was born December 9, 1932, in Hampton, Iowa. His
parents, both teachers, had taken an adventurous honeymoon by motor car through
the southwest to California in the mid-twenties, vowing to move to New Mexico to
make their home at the earliest opportunity. The move came in 1937, when his father
accepted a position as principal of the Training School at New Mexico Normal
College in Las Vegas. With his father’s commission as a Navy officer at the outbreak

4. The following biography was provided by Justice Ransom.
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of World War II, Richard was destined to complete his school years at nine schools
in five communities in four states.
Ransom was a 1950 Albuquerque High School graduate. He entered the
University of New Mexico (UNM) as a Navy ROTC Marine Corps candidate,
majoring in political science with a concentration in Eighteenth Century political
philosophy. He enjoyed sports and was a track letterman in high school and college.
At UNM, he was president of the senior men’s honorary society, the political science
fraternity, and the senior class. Following graduation with University Honors in
1954, Ransom served in the Marines as a rifle platoon leader and company
commander.
Justice Ransom attended law school at Georgetown University, receiving
his law degree in 1959. Returning to New Mexico, he joined the law firm of Smith
and Kiker, where his practice consisted largely of representing persons seeking
compensation for injuries suffered through the fault of others. During his twentyeight years of practice, he won several landmark New Mexico consumer protection
cases establishing liability for suppliers of defective and toxic products. He also
served on the Supreme Court Committee on Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, serving
as Chair from 1982 to 1987. He was selected as a Fellow of the International
Academy of Trial Lawyers and served on its board of directors from 1979 to 1985.
He also served as State Chairman of the American College of Trial Lawyers from
1984 to 1986.
In 1986, Ransom was elected to the New Mexico Supreme Court, serving
as Chief Justice from 1991 to 1994. During his ten years on the Court, Justice
Ransom authored nearly 300 opinions, including thirty-five special concurrences and
fifteen dissents. He also authored over 100 unpublished opinions.
As Chief Justice, among other administrative initiatives, he oversaw the
changes in appellate jurisdiction that allowed more discretionary review by the
Supreme Court and full court rather than panel participation on cases reviewed by
the Supreme Court. After his retirement from the bench, he served for a number of
years as an adjunct professor at the UNM School of Law and was the recipient of
numerous awards from the Albuquerque Bar, the State Bar, and the Law School.
2.

Seth D. Montgomery5

A native of Santa Fe, New Mexico, Seth Montgomery was born on February
16, 1937, to A.K. and Ruth Montgomery. Seth was educated in the public schools of
Santa Fe, graduating from Santa Fe High School in 1955. He entered Princeton
University as a Navy ROTC candidate, and graduated magna cum laude with a
philosophy degree in 1959. He saw duty as a Navy line officer for three years before
entering Stanford Law School, where he became editor-in-chief of the Stanford Law
Review, graduating near the top of the class in 1965.
After completing his law studies, Seth returned to Santa Fe, joining his
father’s law firm, now known as Montgomery & Andrews. During his twenty-four
years in private practice, Seth developed expertise in complex litigation,

5. The following biography was gleaned from an obituary published in THE SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN. Daniel Chacon, Former Chief Justice Recalled as ‘The Soul of the Judiciary,’ THE SANTA FE
NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 19, 1998, at 9, 11.
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transactional law, and appellate law. He was selected as a Fellow of both the
American College of Trial Lawyers and the American College of Probate Counsel.
He was sought out by many in the bar for his extraordinary judgment and sound
advice, which he kindly and graciously shared with all. Seth was recognized not only
for his legal expertise; he also exhibited his devotion to many local and national
public service activities, including service on the Board of Bar Commissioners and
as Chairman and President of the Santa Fe Opera. For thirteen years, he also served
on the New Mexico Advisory Council to the National Legal Services Corporation,
which provides civil legal services throughout the country to those in need. Despite
being afflicted with multiple sclerosis in 1971, Seth continued to serve his clients,
the profession, and many community service organizations with great dedication and
good humor.
In 1989, he was appointed to the state Supreme Court by Governor Garrey
Carruthers, where he served as Associate Justice. Toward the end of his career, he
was elected as Chief Justice by his colleagues, serving until his retirement in October
1994. He remained active and involved in the law in his later years, authoring a
seminal article on appellate jurisdiction that was completed by his attorney son,
Andrew, after Seth’s untimely death at age 61 on September 18, 1998.6
3.

Justice Ransom’s Reflection on Their Special Relationship

At the request of the authors, Justice Ransom provided the following
recollection of his relationship with Justice Montgomery:
Most often Justice Seth Montgomery and I were in full agreement
over the disposition of cases authored by ourselves and by our
colleagues in whose authorships we participated. Soon after his
arrival on the Court, it became customary for me to drop by Justice
Montgomery’s chambers for chats in the late afternoon before his
wife Peggy came with the specially equipped family van for his
ride home.
A close bond of friendship grew between us from those late
afternoon discussions wherein we often strove, sometimes
successfully but usually not, to recruit the other on a point of law
against his will. One might think my background in tort litigation
and his in transactional law would be a barrier to our collegial
partnership, but our mutual respect for the other seemed to bring
about harmony in any conflict.
If we had separate identifiable bents, it may be that I began by
looking to the sanctity of process while he began by looking to the
sanctity of fairness in the result of the case in controversy—as is
evident in many of the cases reviewed in this article.

6. See Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery, Jurisdiction as May be Provided by Law:
Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36 N.M. L. REV. 215 (2006).

Summer 2022 A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

431

Justice Montgomery was a man of unique courage, vigor, and
perseverance. He lived by the motto: “I will do as much as I can
as long as I can.” The sound intellect and beauty of this man’s
personality are reflected in his Supreme Court authorships.
II.

THE RANSOM-MONTGOMERY DIALOGUES EXPLORED
THROUGH THEIR WRITTEN OPINIONS

The interplay between Justices Ransom and Montgomery touched on an
array of issues dealt with by the Supreme Court, some of which might also merit
further study.7 The subjects chosen here provide instances where their views are most
fully elaborated, allowing in depth exploration of their respective views and
influence on one another, as well as their effect on the further development of the
law.
Part A of this section of the article is an analysis of the development of the
law of negligence, with a focus on the two justices’ differing views of when a duty
of care to prevent harm to others arises and the proper roles of the judge and jury in
resolving the question. That task was not fully completed when they left the bench,
and this sub-section concludes with a review of cases in which subsequent justices
built on their body of work to further advance the law of negligence in New Mexico.
Part B, which follows, traces the development of the jurisdiction of New
Mexico appellate courts. The major issue involves the interplay of New Mexico
constitutional provisions dealing with appellate jurisdiction, the role of the
legislature in determining appellate jurisdiction, and the proper role of the Court,
exercising its rule-making power, to affect access to the appellate courts. Multiple
cases dealing with this topic during their joint tenure on the Court provide fertile soil
for exploring Justices Ransom and Montgomery’s differing views, their attempts to
accommodate their respective perspectives, and, when agreement was not possible,
the civility of their expressions when writing separately.
A.

The Nature and Source of the Defendant’s Duty in Negligence Actions

For more than ninety years, law students have read and debated the iconic
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.8 that attempted to decide when one
person owes a duty of reasonable care to prevent harm to others and when the law
will impose liability for a breach of that duty when the harm occurs. In Palsgraf, two
eminent Judges of the New York Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Cardozo, writing

7. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 1993-NMSC-077, 116 N.M. 599, 866 P.2d 327 (Ransom, C.J.,
writing for the majority and Montgomery, J., dissenting) (differing over proper evaluation of evidence
and procedural court Rules to allow withdraw of a guilty plea); State v. Neely, 1991-NMSC-087, 112
N.M. 702, 819 P.2d 249 (Ransom, J. specially concurring and Montgomery, J. dissenting in part)
(differing views on the validity of the guilty but mentally ill verdict and the proper jury instructions);
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1990-NMSC-083, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (Ransom, J. writing for
majority and Montgomery, J., dissenting in part) (differing views on the handling of evidentiary and
legislative facts in a constitutional challenge to the legislative cap on damages); Hale v. Basin Motor Co.,
1990-NMSC-068, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006 (Ransom, J., writing for the Court, Montgomery, J.,
specially concurring) (disagreeing over the distinction between “remedial” and “substantive” statutes and
the importance of the underlying purpose of the statute).
8. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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for a four-person majority, and Judge Andrews, for a dissenting group of three, set
forth starkly different views of those issues.
No doubt Richard Ransom and Seth Montgomery participated in this ritual
introduction to the law of torts at their respective law schools. They could not have
anticipated, however, that they would engage in that debate as members of the New
Mexico Supreme Court. But they did so, and their dialogue laid the groundwork for
their successors to choose a new path governing the law of tort duty and the law of
negligence in New Mexico.
The discussion of this topic proceeds in four sections: first, a review of the
Cardozo-Andrews debate in Palsgraf; second, a discussion of the negligence/duty
cases during the Ransom-Montgomery era; third, the influence of Justices Ransom
and Montgomery on the later development of the law; and finally, a summary review
of the negligence/duty issue.
1.

The Palsgraf Case

It is axiomatic that a negligence claim requires the existence of a duty owed
by a defendant to a plaintiff, breach of that duty, which is typically based upon a
standard of reasonable care, and the breach of duty must be a cause-in-fact and
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”9 In Palsgraf, Judges Cardozo and Andrews
formulated their different perspectives on the central issues of negligence law: when
does a person owe a duty of care to protect others from harm?; and what is the
relationship among duty, breach of duty, and the required proof that a breach of duty
caused compensable harm?
In Palsgraf, a passenger carrying a package wrapped in newspaper sought
to board a train that had begun to leave the station. Railroad employees assisted him
to get on the train. As they did so, the passenger dropped the package. Unknown to
the railroad employees, the dropped package contained fireworks that exploded
when the package fell to the tracks. The resulting shock waves caused scales located
“at the other end of the platform many feet away” to fall, striking Palsgraf.10 She
sued the railroad for negligence, claiming the railroad owed her a duty of care, that
its employees breached the duty, and that she suffered injuries as a result. The trial
judge allowed the case to go to the jury, which found for Palsgraf. The intermediate
appellate court affirmed, and the Railroad obtained further review in the New York
Court of Appeals.11
Chief Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, vacated the judgment for
Palsgraf and ordered that judgment be entered for the Railroad because the Railroad
owed no duty to protect Palsgraf from the injuries she suffered.12 Judge Andrews, in
dissent, would have affirmed the jury verdict, concluding the Railroad did owe a duty

9. See Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, Inc., 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181. In 2004
the New Mexico Supreme Court eliminated the phrase “proximate cause” from the applicable Uniform
Jury Instruction. See UJI 13-305 NMRA. The change was “intended to make the instruction clearer to the
jury and [does] not signal any change in the law of proximate cause.” Id. cmt.
10. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 340–41.
11. See id. at 347.
12. Id. at 341.
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to Palsgraf13 and the jury was justified in concluding that the Railroad’s negligence
was a proximate cause of her injuries.14
Judge Cardozo’s analysis began with the proposition that the Railroad owed
a duty of care only to those persons whom the Railroad could reasonably foresee
would be harmed at the time its employees acted: “The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another
or to others within the range of apprehension.”15 Having limited the Railroad’s duty
to foreseeable victims when its employees acted, Judge Cardozo declared that the
question whether a person was within the zone of foreseeable risk of injury was “at
times a question for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a
question for the jury.”16 In this instance, because the parties had conceded that “there
was nothing in the situation to suggest . . . that the parcel wrapped in newspaper
would spread wreckage through the station,” he concluded as a matter of law that
Palsgraf was not a foreseeable victim of the employees’ conduct when assisting the
passenger carrying a seemingly harmless package17 and could not recover from the
railroad. 18
Judge Andrews chose a different path. He argued that constraining liability
by limiting an actor’s duty to those foreseeably injured by the actor’s conduct was a
mistake. Instead, “[e]veryone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others . . . even if he be
outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.”19 Limitations on liability
should be determined by the requirement that negligent actors are liable only if their
breach of the universal duty of care is “so connected with the negligence that the
latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.”20

13. Id. at 350, 356 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 356 (Andrews, J., dissenting). Having found no duty, Judge Cardozo did not reach the issue
of proximate cause: “The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us . . .
If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage might be recovered.” Id.
at 346.
15. Id. at 344.
16. Id. at 345. The statement that it is for the jury to decide if the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim
“if varying inferences are possible” has not met with universal approval among New Mexico Justices who
otherwise adopted Judge Cardozo’s “foreseeable plaintiff” limit on the scope of the duty owed in a
negligence action. Id. Compare Calkins v. Cox Ests., 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 18, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36
(Baca, J., writing for the majority) (the judge decides foreseeability as a matter of law), with Torres ex rel.
Torres v. State, 1995-NMSC-025, ¶ 15, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (Ransom, J., writing for the majority)
(juries decide if plaintiff was foreseeable unless as a matter of law no reasonable jury reach could reach
the result it did).
17. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 345.
18. Because the Railroad owed no duty to Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo had no occasion to delineate the
nature of the duty the railroad would have owed Palsgraf, or whether the employees’ conduct would have
breached that duty. Nor was it necessary for him to determine whether a breach of the railroad’s duty
would have been a proximate cause of her injuries. Nonetheless, Judge Cardozo opined “[w]e may assume,
without deciding, that negligence in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary.” Id. at 346.
19. Id. at 350 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 351 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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Because juries and not judges are the primary determiners of proximate
cause,21 Judge Andrews would delegate to the jury the role of placing limits on
liability for negligent conduct, unconstrained by technical legal definitions of
proximate cause:
What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is that, because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics . . . . The words [are]
simply indicative of our notions of public policy.22
Removing foreseeability of harm from duty analysis, Judge Andrews would
instead make it just one of many factors for the factfinder to take into account in
determining proximate cause.23 Among other non-decisive factors, Judge Andrews
added whether the injury is too remote in time and space from the negligent act, “for
the greater the distance in time or space, the more surely do other causes intervene
to affect the result.”24
The competing viewpoints of Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in
Palsgraf became the focal point for other jurisdictions struggling to determine
whether to set limits on liability for negligent conduct by limiting duty or by using
proximate cause as the vehicle for doing so, including New Mexico.
2.

The Negligence/Duty Cases During the Ransom-Montgomery Era

In New Mexico, there were few early references to Palsgraf.25 The Supreme
Court first discussed Palsgraf in some detail three years before Justice Ransom
joined the Court. In Ramirez v. Armstrong,26 the Court decided that a cause of action
exists in New Mexico for negligent infliction of mental distress to certain bystanders
who witness a family member injured by the negligence of a third person.27 The
Court noted that “duty and foreseeability have been closely integrated concepts in
21. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 312, 414 N.E.2d 666, 668 (1980)
(“As a general rule, the question of proximate cause is to be decided by the finder of fact, aided by
appropriate instructions.”). However, “a court may decide questions of . . . proximate cause, if no facts
are presented that could allow a reasonable jury to find proximate cause.” Calkins v. Cox Ests., 1990NMSC-044, ¶ 18 n.6, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36. Judge Andrews concluded “I cannot say, as a matter of
law that the plaintiff’s injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before
us.” Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 356 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
22. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 353–54 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“What the prudent would foresee . . . may have some
bearing, for the problem of proximate cause is not to be solved by any one consideration.”).
24. Id. at 354 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
25. Curry v. Journal Publishing Co.,1937-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 26–28, 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168,
overruled by Ramirez v. Armstrong, 1983-NMSC-104, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822; Southern Union Gas
Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co, 1958-NMSC-123, ¶ 18, 65 N.M. 32, 331 P.2d 531, overruled by Ramirez
v. Armstrong, 1983-NMSC-104, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822; Barham v. Baca, 1969-NMSC-105, ¶ 5,
80 N.M. 502, 458 P.2d 228.
26. 1983-NMSC-104, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822, overruled in part on other grounds by Folz v.
State, 1990-NMSC-075, ¶ 3, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (“We reject the Ramirez requirement that
‘[t]here must be some physical manifestation of, or physical injury to the plaintiff resulting from the
emotional injury.’”)
27. Id. ¶ 2, 673 P.2d at 823.
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tort law since Palsgraf stated the issue of foreseeability in terms of duty.”28 The
Court stated that Palsgraf ruled that “[i]f it is found that a plaintiff and injury to that
plaintiff were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.”29
To assure that harm to the family unit would be the focus of the tort, the Ramirez
Court adopted criteria to limit the range of “deserving claimants,” one of which
requires there be a “marital or intimate familial relationship between the victim and
the plaintiff.”30 The Court thus linked the purpose of the tort—protection of the
integrity of the family unit—to the limits of who would be deemed foreseeable
plaintiffs. This interplay between policy and the use of the foreseeable plaintiff limit
on duty would provide a template for the dialogue between Justices Ransom and
Montgomery that follows.
a. Cross v. City of Clovis
Before Justice Montgomery joined the Court, Justice Ransom authored the
opinion for the Court in Cross v. City of Clovis.31 The case involved the death of
Alan Cross, a young observer standing next to his motorbike watching police set up
roadblocks to stop the driver of a stolen vehicle. When a first roadblock failed, the
police set up a second one. Cross had been an onlooker at both the first and second
roadblocks, but the police only saw him at the scene at the second roadblock, where
they did not warn him to move farther away. The stolen vehicle crashed through the
second roadblock, striking and killing Cross. Cross’s personal representative sued
the City, claiming its police officers were negligent for failing to warn Cross to
vacate the area. The trial court granted the City’s motion for a directed verdict,
finding that the City owed no duty to Cross, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Ransom reversed the judgment for the City.
Justice Ransom acknowledged that in New Mexico, whether a defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty is a question for the court to decide.32 There was no
foreseeable plaintiff issue presented, however, because a police officer testified that
the deceased was standing within the zone of foreseeable danger when struck by the
vehicle.33 Instead, after describing the duty the police owed Cross,34 Justice Ransom
ruled the jury could reasonably conclude that the police breached the duty35 and the
negligence of the police officers proximately caused his death.36 Because the issues

28. Id. ¶ 9, 673 P.2d at 825.
29. Id. In isolation, the sentence suggests that the only criterion for the imposition of a duty of care
is that the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff is at risk of harm when the defendant acts. The Ramirez
Court’s focus on the policies supporting the cause of action and the resulting limits of its scope belies that
impression.
30. Id. ¶ 11, 673 P.2d at 825.
31. 1988-NMSC-045, 107 N.M. 251, 755 P.2d 589.
32. Id. ¶ 5, 755 P.2d at 591 (quoting Schear v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 1984-NMSC-079, ¶ 4, 101
N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728).
33. Id. ¶ 18, 755 P.2d at 593.
34. “[A] law enforcement officer has the duty in any activity actually undertaken to exercise for the
safety of others that care ordinarily exercised by a reasonably prudent and qualified officer in light of the
nature of what is being done.” Id. ¶ 6, 755 P.2d at 591.
35. Id. ¶ 16, 755 P.2d at 593.
36. Id. ¶ 18, 755 P.2d at 593.
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of breach and proximate cause could not be determined as a matter of law, the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial.37
In dicta, Justice Ransom rejected an alternative claim that the police were
also negligent in handling the first roadblock for two reasons: first, because the
officers “denied seeing Alan at [that] intersection” and second, in any event, “their
conduct at the initial roadblock is too remote for a finding of liability independent of
conduct at the second roadblock.”38 In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews
each assigned the remoteness consideration as a factor to determine proximate
cause,39 but Justice Ransom’s passing reference to remoteness here, is not tethered
to either duty or proximate cause. It proved, however, to be an important concept
that Justice Ransom expanded upon in the cases that follow.
b. Calkins v. Cox Estates
Calkins v. Cox Estates40 was the first of the cases in which Justice Ransom
and Justice Montgomery were on the same panel addressing the significance of
Palsgraf in the development of New Mexico law. The issues involved the
relationship of the different elements of a negligence action and the allocation among
them of evidence relevant to each. Their differing views were evident in the majority
opinion written by Justice Baca that Justice Montgomery joined41 and Justice
Ransom’s extensive dissent presenting an alternative perspective that would
eventually lead to dueling opinions authored by Justice Montgomery and Justice
Ransom.
In Calkins, the owner of an apartment complex provided a fenced
playground for use of the tenants. The fence was in a state of disrepair and had a hole
in it. Eight-year-old Enriquez, who lived with his grandparents at defendant’s
apartment complex, exited the hole in the fence and proceeded almost 950 feet to a
busy roadway where he was struck and killed by a passing car. The family sued for
wrongful death, alleging that the landowner’s negligence in maintaining the fence
was a breach of duty and a proximate cause of Enriquez’ death. Finding that the
apartment owner owed no duty to Enriquez, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the landlord, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed the summary judgment, ruling that the landowner owed a duty of care to
Enriquez and remanded the case for trial on the issues of breach and proximate
cause.42
The Calkins Court began its analysis by stating that an issue of
foreseeability is relevant to both the question of whether a duty is owed and also

37. Id. ¶ 19, 755 P.2d at 593.
38. Id. ¶ 9, 755 P.2d at 592.
39. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 346, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(because there was no duty, “[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before
us.”); Id. at 354 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (in determining proximate cause, “[i]s the result too remote from
the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.”).
40. 1990-NMSC-044, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36.
41. In writing the majority opinion in Calkins, their colleague Joseph Baca played a significant role
on the Court’s early development of the law of duty.
42. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 20, 792 P.2d at 43.
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whether a breach of duty is a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.43 Citing
Palsgraf, the Court acknowledged that a defendant owes a duty only to persons
whom the actor can foresee is put at risk by the actor’s conduct, and that “[t]his
concept limits liability for negligent conduct.”44 The majority opinion, however,
made clear that foreseeability of a different sort is relevant to determine proximate
cause—whether the injury to the foreseeable plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the
defendant’s conduct—which the Court equated with foreseeability of the “manner of
harm” to the plaintiff.45 The distinction is important, noted the Court, because the
“foreseeable plaintiff” requirement for duty is resolved as a matter of law by the
judge,46 while the proximate cause question of foreseeability of manner of harm is a
factual question for the jury.47
While in 1983, in Ramirez v. Armstrong,48 the New Mexico Supreme Court
seemingly construed Judge Cardozo’s opinion as making the presence of a
foreseeable victim the sole criterion for duty creation,49 Justice Baca’s ruling in
Calkins differed. He introduced an important additional criterion that must be met
before a court creates a duty: “The existence of a duty is a question of policy to be
determined with reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles
comprising the law.”50

43. Id. ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 38.
44. Id. ¶ 7, 792 P.2d at 39.
45. Id. ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 38.
46. Id.; see also S. Union Gas. Co. v. Briner Rust Proofing Co., 1958-NMSC-123, ¶ 18, 65 N.M. 32,
331 P.2d 531 (“Whether, indeed, under the circumstances of a given case, a duty exists is a pure question
of law for determination by the court.”).
47. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 38. Justice Ransom disagreed with Justice Baca’s
placement of foreseeability of the manner of harm as the test for proximate cause. Id. ¶ 22, 792 P.2d at 43
(Ransom, J., dissenting). He noted that the then-applicable Uniform Jury Instruction, UJI 13-305 NMRA,
stated the test for proximate cause was whether the resulting injury occurred in “a natural and continuous
sequence” from the breach rather than in a foreseeable manner. Id. ¶ 21, 792 P.2d at 43 (Ransom, J.,
dissenting). For Justice Ransom, only when an in issue of independent intervening cause is at issue did
the issue of foreseeability become relevant to a determination of proximate cause, pursuant to a
supplemental instruction, UJI 13-306 NMRA. Id. ¶ 22, 792 P.2d at 43 (Ransom, J., dissenting). In 2004,
the Supreme Court made a significant change in UJI 13-305 NMRA, which now provides that to be a
cause, the defendant’s conduct “must be reasonably connected as a significant link to the [injury] [harm].”
UJI 13-305 NMRA. The independent intervening instruction continues to reference foreseeability. UJI
13-306 NMRA.
48. 1983-NMSC-104, ¶ 9, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822.
49. Id. ¶ 9, 673 P.2d at 825 (stating that Palsgraf framed the issue of foreseeability of the plaintiff as
a victim of defendant’s conduct as the sole determinant of duty: “If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury
to that plaintiff, were foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.”). But see Cross
v. City of Clovis, 1988-NMSC-045, ¶ 5, 107 N.M. 251, 755 P.2d 589 (holding that “[w]hether a duty
exists is a question of law for the courts to decide”).
50. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 8, 792 P.2d at 39. The Calkins majority did not explicitly state the
relationship between the “foreseeable plaintiff” test and the use of policy criteria for determining duty—
namely whether either alone may suffice or whether each must be met. This is because the majority found
both were present: Enriquez was a foreseeable plaintiff, id. ¶ 18, 792 P.2d at 42, and New Mexico statutes
and case law expressed the policy that a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care based on the
landlord/tenant relationship. Id. ¶ 12, 792 P.2d at 40. In finding that both were present, though, the
majority may have implied that both criteria must be met before the court imposes a duty of care on the
actor.
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Having found the landlord owed a duty to Enriquez, the Calkins majority
also addressed the nature of the duty that the landlord owed. While the general
proposition is that an actor owes a duty “to act reasonably under the
circumstances,”51 the same statute or case precedent that creates a duty can also
provide a specific statement of the duty owed that modifies the general rule.52
Finding both precedent and a statute imposed a specific duty, the Court concluded
that Cox Estates owed a duty of care to reasonably maintain common areas.53 The
Court remanded the case for the jury to decide whether Cox Estates breached its duty
of care and, if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause of Enriquez’s death.54
Justice Ransom, in dissent, agreed with the majority that whether a duty is
owed involves two considerations: First, was the plaintiff a foreseeable victim of the
defendant’s conduct when the defendant acted?55 Second, does existing legal policy
support the imposition of a duty?56 But it is at that juncture that Justice Ransom
diverged from the Court’s opinion. The majority stated the relevant policies were “to
be determined [by] reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles
comprising the law.”57 Justice Ransom instead endorsed the articulation of public
policy found in Judge Andrews’ Palsgraf dissent: “[B]ecause of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily [decides whether] to
trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics.”58 Judge Andrews’ statement of policy addressed factors relevant to
determining proximate cause, rather than duty.59 Nonetheless, Justice Ransom stated
he would “utilize this policy concept”—unmoored from Judge Andrews’ articulation
of proximate cause—“in deciding duty as a matter of law.”60 He labelled this
formulation of policy “the doctrine of remoteness.”61
Justice Ransom was searching for a policy basis to justify limiting the scope
of the duty owed to a foreseeable victim of a defendant’s conduct. He acknowledged
that in Calkins, the apartment owner had a duty to maintain the common areas of the
51. Id. ¶ 11, 792 P.2d at 40; see also UJI 13-1603 NMRA (ordinary care); UJI 13-1604 NMRA (duty
to use ordinary care).
52. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 17, 792 P.2d at 42 (“Statute dictates that a landlord has a
responsibility to maintain the common areas reserved to the use of the tenants.”); see also Edward C. v.
City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 40–41, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086, overruled by Rodriguez
v. Del Sol Shopping Ctr. Assocs. L.P., 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 3, 326 P.3d 465 (modifying the duty of
ordinary care for owners/occupiers of commercial baseball stadiums).
53. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 13–14, 792 P.2d at 40.
54. Id. ¶ 20, 792 P.2d at 43.
55. Id. ¶ 24, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). He also stated that the foreseeability component
of duty “is most often a question of fact and only rarely, as in Palsgraf, may foreseeability be considered
a false jury issue.” Id. ¶ 25, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). This statement is consistent Judge
Cardozo’s view, see Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339 at 356, but contrary to Justice Baca’s majority view in Calkins
that “whether the injury to petitioner was a foreseeable result of respondent’s breach . . . must be decided
as a matter of law by the judge.” Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 38.
56. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 25, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
57. Id. ¶ 8, 792 P.2d at 39.
58. Id. ¶ 26, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting) (quoting Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352 (Andrews,
J., dissenting)).
59. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 352 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
60. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 26, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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apartment complex,62 including the playground, and did not dispute that Enriquez,
as a tenant, was a foreseeable victim of defendant’s negligent maintenance of the
fence around the playground. He also accepted the court of appeals’ assumption that
the purpose of the fence was “to avoid foreseeable risk of harm to tenant children
attracted to adjoining property.”63
Nonetheless, Justice Ransom determined “as a matter of policy . . . it would
be unreasonable to impose a duty on the part of the landlord to safeguard eight-yearold tenants from risks of injury on streets not immediately adjoining the property.”64
Having concluded that the duty to maintain the fence was not intended to protect
against the hazard of being struck by a vehicle travelling on a frontage road almost
950 feet away,65 Justice Ransom would rule that “the frontage road hazard was too
remote as a matter of law to constitute a risk of injury reasonably giving rise to any
duty to maintain the playground fence.”66
Applying the remoteness doctrine in this way, Justice Ransom would hold
that the duty to maintain the playground fence as a matter law was not intended to
protect against the dangers of distant hazards. If, however, Enriquez had been struck
by a vehicle on a street immediately adjoining the hole in the fence, a jury could
conclude that the negligent failure to maintain the fence was a proximate cause of
his death.67

62. Id. ¶ 21, 792 P.2d at 43 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
63. Id. ¶ 28, 792 P.2d at 45 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
64. Id. ¶ 29, 792 P.2d at 45 (Ransom, J., dissenting). Justice Ransom was concerned that without
such a limitation on the duty, the majority’s approach would unduly expand the general common law duty
of landlords to reasonably maintain the common areas of rental property to encompass a duty to restrain
young tenants from leaving the apartment complex and confronting risks of danger well beyond the
complex. See id.
65. Justice Ransom emphasized that “[t]he doctrine of remoteness is not necessarily dependent upon
considerations of time and space; although in the instant case, our policy determination involves those
considerations.” Id. ¶ 27, 792 P.2d at 45 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
66. Id. ¶ 22, 792 P.2d at 44 (Ransom, J., dissenting). Had he persuaded a majority to his view, Justice
Ransom might have taken the New Mexico law of negligence in a different direction. He repurposed
Judge Andrews’ formulation of public policy into “the crux of the duty analysis” that he identified as the
policy of remoteness, which “delimits the risk of injury that reasonably may give rise to the existence of
duty.” Id. Use of the doctrine in that way would empower judges to determine the outer limits of the
hazards that the Rule or statute is designed to protect against. If the hazard encountered is beyond those
limits, no duty is owed. If the hazard is within those limits the jury may determine whether a breach of
duty is a proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury.
67. Justice Ransom’s approach finds support in early academic writing advocating that judges must
impose limits on the scope of cognizable tort liability before questions of breach and causation are
properly submitted to juries for resolution. See, e.g., Leon Green, Causal Relation in Legal Liability—In
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 513 (1927). Professor Green asserted that appellate courts in tort cases must focus on
whether the plaintiff’s interest is protected by statute or common law “against the particular hazard
encountered by the plaintiff. Id. at 514 (emphasis added). If the court concludes the particular hazard
encountered was not one the law sought to protect against, the court must bar recovery as a matter of law.
Professor Green sought thereby to limit the scope of the jury’s relatively unguided determination of
proximate cause. Id. at 518. This is the same goal Justice Ransom pursued when he sought to transform a
portion of Judge Andrews’ proximate cause formula into the policy of remoteness by which judges can
determine whether as a matter of law the duty imposed affords no protection against the hazard
encountered by the plaintiff.

440

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

c. Bober v. New Mexico State Fair
In Bober v. New Mexico State Fair,68 Justice Montgomery authored his first
opinion in a case raising Palsgraf-like issues. He wrote for a unanimous panel that
did not include Justice Ransom. Bober involved a concert that drew thousands to the
State Fairgrounds. A concert goer exited a parking lot on the grounds, turned left
onto a heavily travelled street adjoining the fairgrounds, and struck a vehicle in
which Bober was a passenger, seriously injuring him.
Bober sued several defendants, including the State Fair, for negligence. He
alleged that the crash resulted because the State Fair failed to take reasonable
measures to control the flow of traffic exiting the fairgrounds onto the street. The
District Court granted summary judgment for the State Fair, ruling that it owed no
duty to a passerby on the adjoining street who was neither an invitee nor licensee on
the State Fair premises.69 Justice Montgomery reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case to the district court for trial.70
Referring to Calkins, Justice Montgomery characterized the issue as raising
“again whether a landlord’s duty to avoid creating a dangerous condition on the land”
is limited by the physical boundaries of the land.71 To resolve the issue, he did not
apply the foreseeable plaintiff test he approved as a member of the majority in
Calkins to determine if the State Fair owed a duty of care to a person on a road
adjacent to its land. Instead, Justice Montgomery found the source of the State Fair’s
duty to Bober in a New Mexico precedent, Mitchell v. C&H Transportation Co.,72
where lessees of land failed to maintain their driveway adjacent to a highway,
causing a truck and tractor leaving the premise to get stuck, with a portion of the
tractor in the highway. Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle on the highway injured
when the vehicle collided with the tractor. Mitchell held that a person obligated to
maintain property in a safe condition “has a duty to the travelling public to exercise
reasonable care in maintaining property adjacent to a public road or street.”73
Mitchell thus provided what Calkins described as “a specific . . . common law
standard that creates the affirmative duty to a party.”74
Having determined that the State Fair owed a duty to Bober, Justice
Montgomery turned to the separate question of the articulation of the duty that the
State Fair owed Bober. Justice Montgomery could not use the usual Uniform Jury
Instruction stating a landowner’s duty because it applies only to visitors on the land.75
Rather, he applied the statement of the duty owed in UJI 13-1604 that “[e]very person
has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the person and property of
others,”76 supported further by UJI 13-1603, which provides:

68. 1991-NMSC-031, 111 N.M. 644, 808 P.2d 614.
69. Id. ¶ 1, 808 P.2d at 616.
70. Id. ¶ 34, 808 P.2d at 624.
71. Id. ¶ 1, 808 P.2d at 616.
72. See 1977-NMSC-045, ¶ 16, 90 N.M. 471, 565 P.2d 342.
73. Id. ¶ 30, 565 P.2d at 347.
74. Calkins, 1990-NMSC- 044, ¶ 8, 792 P.2d at 38 n.1.
75. “An [owner] [occupant] owes a visitor the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for
use by the visitor.” UJI 13-1309 NMRA (emphasis added).
76. Bober, 1991-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 808 P.2d at 618.
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What constitutes “ordinary care” varies with the nature of what is
being done.
As the risk of danger that should reasonably be foreseen increases,
the amount of care required also increases.77
Thus, although the usual definition of the duty owed—ordinary care—
remains constant, the instruction provides that what is ordinary care may vary
depending upon the degree of danger the defendant can foresee from its conduct.
Foreseeability, therefore, played multiple roles in a negligence action: The
Calkins foreseeable plaintiff test is relevant to whether the defendant owed a duty of
care; Bober noted the Uniform Jury Instruction provides the foreseeability of the
extent of danger to the foreseeable plaintiff is a factor in determining whether the
defendant breached the duty owed; and the majority in Calkins ruled determining the
foreseeability of the manner of harm is “integral” to the determination of proximate
cause.78 Subsequent decisions discussed in this article reconsider and reconfigure
these disparate roles of foreseeability in the New Mexico law of negligence.79
d. Solon v. WEK Drilling Co.
Two years after Calkins, Justice Montgomery and Justice Ransom authored
separate opinions in Solon v. WEK Drilling Co.,80 in which they expressed their
evolving but differing views about Palsgraf and the Court’s interpretation of
Palsgraf in Calkins. In Solon, Ivan Ponce died in an oil rig accident while working
at a site owned and operated by WEK. The personal representative of his estate sued
WEK for wrongful death on behalf of Ponce’s daughter, his sole statutory
beneficiary.81 At the time of his death, Ponce was living at his parents’ home where
he provided assistance in maintaining their home and vehicles.
The parents filed a motion to intervene in the wrongful death action,
asserting a cause of action against WEK for the value of their deceased son’s
household services and for loss of consortium. The trial court denied their motion to
intervene on the ground that their complaint failed to state a cause of action. The
77. Id.
78. “In determining proximate cause, an essential element of foreseeability is also present—the
question of whether the injury to petitioner was a foreseeable result of respondent’s breach—i.e., what
manner of harm is foreseeable.” Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 39. In Calkins, Justice
Ransom disagreed, stating that foreseeability was relevant to proximate cause only in situations where the
issue involved a possible independent intervening cause. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 792 P.2d at 43 (Ransom, J.
dissenting).
79. See Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018,134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181; Rodriguez v. Del
Sol Shopping Ctr. Assoc., 2014-NMSC-014, 326 P.3d 465.
80. 1992-NMSC-023, 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645. Just prior to Solon, in Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.,
1992-NMSC-008, 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293, another three-judge panel addressed aspects of the
Calkins case in an opinion authored by Justice Ransom and joined in by Justice Baca and Justice Franchini.
The case involved the proper construction of a Uniform Jury Instruction dealing with when a duty is owed
by a land occupier to protect a business visitor from open and obvious dangers on the premises. Perhaps
because the jury instruction upon which it was based, UJI 13-1310 NMRA, was later withdrawn, and an
amended instruction incorporating the Klopp rule, UJI 13-1309 NMRA, was adopted in 1996, the case
did not play a significant role in the subsequent development of the law of duty in New Mexico.
81. N.M. STAT. ANN, § 41-2-3(C) (2001).
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parents appealed, claiming a right to damages as parents, apart from those awarded
to the decedent’s daughter under the Wrongful Death Act.
Justice Montgomery, writing for the Court, with Justice Baca concurring,
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the motion to intervene and dismissal of the
parents’ complaint.82 Justice Ransom concurred in the result but wrote a separate
opinion explaining his disagreements with Justice Montgomery’s opinion.
Justice Montgomery’s majority opinion viewed the appeal as “a Palsgraf
case,” and stated the issue as follows: “Whether one who owes a duty to another . . .
in breaching that duty causes the death of the other, also owes a duty to the other’s
parents so that they may sue the tortfeasor, in their own right, for damages sustained
as a result of their son’s death.”83 He concluded that the parents had no cause of
action against WEK and upheld the district court’s ruling denying the parents’
request to intervene in the wrongful death action. 84
Justice Montgomery acknowledged that in Calkins, the opinion for the
Court (in which he joined as a member of the panel) seemed to approve the
“foreseeable plaintiff” test as the sole basis for determining whether the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff when it quoted with approval from Ramirez v.
Armstrong: “If it is found that a plaintiff, and injury to that plaintiff, were
foreseeable, then a duty is owed to that plaintiff by the defendant.”85 But he then
expressed his doubt on the exclusivity of, and even on the requirement, that there can
be no duty owed to a plaintiff who falls outside the zone of foreseeable victims.
Justice Montgomery noted that “[t]he law need not have evolved this way. It could
have evolved along the lines suggested by Judge Andrews in Palsgraf, where Judge
Andrews argued that an actor owed a duty not only to those within “the danger zone,”
but “to the world at large” to refrain from conduct that unreasonably threatened the
safety of others.86
Justice Montgomery also found support in Professor Prosser’s critique of
Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf87 and Prosser’s assertion that the solution for
cutting off unlimited liability for harm caused by defendant’s unreasonable conduct
is not the foreseeable plaintiff test but “one of social policy.”88 Having highlighted
the criticism of the foreseeable plaintiff test for limiting liability, Justice
Montgomery found it inappropriate to decide in Solon whether the Court should
abandon the test because “we are not writing a clean slate, and we do not perceive
this case to be a good one to address the issue.”89 Instead, he applied the test and

82. Solon, 1992-NMSC-023, ¶ 19, 829 P.2d at 651.
83. Id. ¶ 1, 829 P.2d at 645.
84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 9, 829 P.2d at 648 (quoting Ramirez v. Armstrong, 1983-NMSC-104, ¶ 9, 100 N.M. 538,
673 P.2d 822).
86. Id. ¶10, 829 P.2d at 648 (quoting Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 350 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
87. Id. ¶ 10, 829 P.2d at 648. Prosser argued that as between an actor who negligently puts one person
at risk and a totally innocent but not foreseeable victim, the negligent defendant and not the unforeseeable
victim should bear the loss. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 43 at 287 (William Lloyd
Prosser, W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984).
88. Id. ¶ 10, 829 P.2d at 648.
89. Id. ¶11, 829 P.2d at 649.
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ruled: “[T]he existence and interests of the Ponces and the relationship with their son
were unforeseeable to the defendant, WEK Drilling.”90
Nonetheless, he signaled the future course he anticipated for New Mexico
law when he pointedly left open the question of whether the foreseeable plaintiff test
was “a factor—if it is a factor —or the prerequisite—if it is that.”91 In applying the
foreseeable plaintiff test, and ruling it was not met in Solon, Justice Montgomery left
for another day the question whether “to reexamine the social policy that limits a
tortfeasor’s liability to the foreseeable plaintiff and excludes [liability] where the
plaintiff is unforeseeable.”92
Justice Ransom wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the result
affirming the grant of summary judgment. He stated, however, contrary to Justice
Montgomery, that Ponce’s parents were foreseeable victims of WEK’s conduct93 and
that the Court should have proceeded to determine “as a matter of public policy,”
whether a duty of care existed.94 Justice Ransom did not apply his remoteness
doctrine to determine if public policy supported extending WEK’s duty of care to
Ponce’s parents. Instead, he borrowed from Justice Baca and Justice Montgomery’s
sources of public policy.95 Because the Wrongful Death Act assigned all the recovery
in the action to Ponce’s daughter and did not include Ponce’s parents among those
entitled to recover for his death, Justice Ransom reasoned that the legislature
determined the parents’ loss of companionship and economic assistance were not
hazards the legislature intended to protect against.96 Justice Ransom therefore
concluded the parents “are denied a claim for relief, not because risk of harm to them
is unforeseeable, but because of policy set by the legislature.”97

90. Id. ¶ 17, 829 P.2d at 650. He did not endorse the view in Ramirez that the foreseeable plaintiff
test was the only criterion for determining duty.
91. Id. ¶ 16, 829 P.2d at 650. Justice Montgomery also quoted Prosser and Keeton’s treatise’s
suggestion that “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff should be but one factor in determining the
existence of a duty and not always conclusive” because an inflexible foreseeable plaintiff rule does not
allow for “situations that will more or less inevitably arise which do not fit within any fixed and inflexible
rule.” Id. ¶ 12, 829 P.2d at 649.
92. Id. ¶ 11, 829 P.2d at 649. Perhaps recognizing the tenuousness of his conclusion that harm to
Ponce’s parents was not foreseeable when WEK acted, Justice Montgomery acknowledged that “[t]he
social policy of cutting off the liability that would otherwise extend to these family members, seems sound,
at least in a case in which they allege no more palpable injury that that claimed here.” Id. ¶ 17, 829 P.2d
at 650. He buttressed his conclusion by invoking existing New Mexico case law that at the time barred
even spousal consortium, thus presenting a “formidable barrier to recover for loss of consortium—spousal,
filial, parental or other.” Id. ¶ 15, 829 P.2d at 650.
The law denying consortium has since changed. In 1994, the Supreme Court in Romero v. Byers,
1994-NMSC-031, ¶ 27, 117 N.M. 422, 872 P.2d 840, authorized a cause of action for spousal consortium.
Since then, the court of appeals has upheld a consortium cause of action in favor of adult parents for the
death of their child. Fitzgerald v. City of Gallup, 2003-NMCA-125, 134 N.M. 492, 79 P.3d 836.
93. Id. ¶ 24, 829 P.2d at 652 (Ransom, J., concurring).
94. Id. ¶ 25, 829 P.2d at 652 (Ransom, J., concurring).
95. See id. ¶ 21, 829 P.2d at 651 (Ransom, J., concurring) (“I agree with the majority in the instant
case that whether a duty was owed must be decided as a matter of law using existing legal policy.”)
(quoting Calkins v. Cox Estates, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 25, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36).
96. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3(C) (2001).
97. Solon, 1992-NMSC-023, ¶ 25, 829 P.2d at 652 (Ransom, J., concurring).
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e. Torres ex rel. Torres v. State
Justice Montgomery retired in late 1994. A year later, writing for the Court
in Torres ex rel. Torres v. State,98 Justice Ransom again did not apply his remoteness
doctrine because a statutory policy supported the plaintiffs’ claims that a duty
existed. In Torres, an armed man randomly shot and killed three people in
Albuquerque. That evening and the next morning, police received tips that Nathan
Trupp was the likely killer. The police delayed acting on the tips until the following
day when they staked out the airport, bus, and train stations searching for Trupp.
Before the police arrived, Trupp had boarded a bus to Los Angeles, and the next
evening he randomly selected, shot, and killed Torres and Beeks in Los Angeles.
Their personal representatives brought a wrongful death action in New
Mexico against the Albuquerque Police Department and the State Department of
Public Safety under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.99 The suit alleged that the
Defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable care to capture Trupp in New Mexico
allowed him to travel to Los Angeles and kill Torres and Beeks. The trial court
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the basis
that no duty was owed to the deceased because they “were not foreseeable plaintiffs”
of Defendants’ actions. 100 The court of appeals agreed the complaint should be
dismissed but grounded its holding in public policy rather than ruling that Torres and
Beaks were not foreseeable plaintiffs.101
Justice Ransom’s opinion for the Court reversed the judgment dismissing
the complaint and remanded the case to the district court. He concluded that the trial
court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Torres and Beaks were not foreseeable
victims of the Defendants’ conduct in investigating the murders in New Mexico.102
Expansively evaluating whether it is foreseeable that persons would be randomly
murdered in California if a murder investigation were botched in New Mexico,
Justice Ransom found it “not unlikely” that a jury might conclude that a murderer in
New Mexico might travel to other states and commit other murders there.103 He
concluded, therefore, that it was for the jury to determine if Torres and Beaks were
foreseeable victims put at risk by the arguably negligent investigation of the New
Mexico murders.104
However, there would be no need to send the foreseeable plaintiff question
to the jury if the Court determined that policy considerations barred a duty even if

98. 1995-NMSC-025, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386.
99. Id. ¶ 1, 894 P.2d at 388.
100. Id. ¶ 8, 894 P.2d at 389.
101. Id. ¶ 12, 894 P.2d at 390.
102. Without explicitly overruling Calkins’ determination that the court is the sole arbiter of whether
plaintiffs are foreseeable victims of a defendant’s conduct, consistent with his dissent in Calkins, Justice
Ransom ruled that the foreseeable plaintiff question is reserved for the jury to decide unless the court
determines that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were foreseeable: “The issue of foreseeability
is a question for the jury. . . . Foreseeability is a question of law when a court, in reviewing whether a duty
exits, can determine that the victim was unforeseeable to any reasonable mind.” Id. ¶ 15, 894 P.2d at 390.
103. Id. ¶ 19, 894 P.2d at 391.
104. “[F]oreseeability is a question for the jury to determine by giving thought to, among other things,
the time, space, and distance between the alleged failure to investigate and the deaths of the two security
guards.” Id.
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the plaintiffs were foreseeable. Justice Ransom thus found it necessary to evaluate
the court of appeals’ reasoning that policy concerns precluded imposing a duty of
care and found it unsound. In Calkins, he had stated the applicable policy
consideration was the “doctrine of remoteness.” In Solon, he had found it
unnecessary to apply the remoteness doctrine to determine the relevant public policy
concerning the scope of a duty owed because the legislature had set the limit of the
persons the statutory duty sought to protect in the Wrongful Death Act.105 In Torres,
too, he looked to statutes and case precedents to determine if policy considerations
should foreclose finding the Defendants owed a duty to the foreseeable plaintiffs.
Turning to the Tort Claims Act as the relevant expression of policy, Justice
Ransom concluded the Act expressed a legislative policy that law enforcement
officers owe a duty to investigate crime, should be liable for injuries caused by their
negligent breach of that duty,106 and that the legislature intended to protect all
members of the public, without limitation to time or place.107
Acceding to Justice Montgomery’s view that “duty is a question of policy
to be determined with reference to legal precedent, statutes, and other principles
comprising the law,”108 Justice Ransom in essence created a hierarchy of sources for
determining policy, giving primacy to the legislature, and case precedents, with the
policy of remoteness serving as a residual “principle[] comprising the law” for courts
to apply when neither the legislature nor precedent had clearly established the
controlling policy:
It is the particular domain of the legislature [and sometimes the
executive branch], as the voice of the people, to make public policy
. . . . Courts should make policy in order to determine duty only
when the body politic has not spoken and only with the
understanding than any misperception of the public mind may be
corrected shortly by the legislature.109
Justice Ransom thereby positioned the policy of remoteness as a possible,
but often unnecessary, analytical aid for use only when statutes and case law failed
to provide the sources of policy for determining the scope of duty.110
Justice Ransom seemed to have prevailed in his view that Cardozo’s
foreseeable plaintiff test is a prerequisite to the imposition of a duty, surviving
despite Justice Montgomery’s suggestion in Solon that he would reduce that test to

105. Solon, 1992-NMSC-023, ¶ 25, 829 P.2d at 652 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
106. Torres, 1995-NMSC-025, ¶ 11, 894 P.2d at 389.
107. Id. ¶ 17, 894 P.2d at 391.
108. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 8, 792 P.2d at 39 (citation omitted).
109. Torres, 1995-NMSC-025, ¶ 10, 894 P.2d at 389.
110. Justice Ransom’s remoteness doctrine did not survive the transformation of the law of duty in
Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping Ctr. Ass’n, L.P., 2014-NMSC-014, 326 P.3d 465. In its sweeping rejection
of any role of foreseeability in determining duty, the Rodriguez court determined that though Justice
Ransom labelled remoteness “not a fact [but] policy,” the policy of “remoteness often leads toward a
discussion of facts in a particular case; insofar as it does so, it is not a discussion of policy . . . .” “[N]o
duty based upon the foreseeability, improbability, or remote nature of the risk is inconsistent with the
Restatement approach.” Id. ¶ 13, 326 P.3d at 471 (citation omitted). Rodriguez is more fully discussed
infra notes 164–79.
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merely one factor among many in the determination of duty.111 Justice
Montgomery’s view, as a member of the Calkins majority, that it is for the court to
determine if the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s conduct,112
seems to have given way to Justice Ransom’s insistence in Torres that in all but the
most obvious cases, juries must determine whether an injured plaintiff was a
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s conduct.113
Justice Montgomery was, however, a master at setting the stage for
changing the law in the future. He did this in Solon when he conceded that New
Mexico had adopted Judge Cardozo’s foreseeable plaintiff test as a limit on duty but
reminded the reader that the law could have evolved differently had Judge Andrews’
view been adopted, under which there would be no foreseeable plaintiff limit on
duty. Instead “[e]very one owes to the world at large a duty of refraining from those
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others . . . even if he be outside
what would generally be thought the danger zone.”114 Having raised the Andrews
approach as an alternative, he saved serious discussion of its merits for another
day.115 That day did not come for him or for Justice Ransom. But other Justices in
later cases would take up the question whether Judge Andrews’ view of a general
duty to all should prevail in New Mexico after both Justice Ransom and Justice
Montgomery ended their service on the Court.
3. The Post-Ransom-Montgomery Era: New Justices and New
Perspectives
Justice Montgomery retired in 1994. Justice Ransom retired three years
later. In their years together on the Court, they framed the New Mexico negligence
law of duty as they worked from the seminal Palsgraf case though they had not come
to a collaborative resolution of their differences. A new generation of New Mexico
justices would challenge and change the edifice substantially but not totally built by
their joint efforts.
In 2003, in Herrera v. Quality Pontiac,116 the revamped New Mexico
Supreme Court117 had its first significant opportunity to consider the retired Justices’
contributions to the law of duty in negligence actions and to evaluate and build on
111. Solon also demonstrated that the foreseeable plaintiff prerequisite for the existence of a duty is
subject to different interpretations and thus can provide varying outcomes depending on which judge
makes the determination. 1992-NMSC-023, ¶ 12, 829 P.2d at 649. “Harm to [decedent]’s parents is just
too glaringly absent to convince us to recognize a cause of action in their favor.” Id. ¶ 16, 829 P.2d at 650.
Compare with the dissent, “I believe financially dependent parents indeed are foreseeable.” Id. ¶ 24, 829
P.2d at 652 (Ransom, J., dissenting).
112. Calkins, 1990-NMSC-044, ¶ 5, 792 P.2d at 38.
113. Torres, 1995-NMSC-025, ¶ 15, 894 P.2d at 390.
114. Solon, 1992-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 829 P.2d at 648 (citation omitted).
115. “[W]e are not writing on a clean slate, and we do not perceive this case to a be a good one to
reexamine” the wisdom of adopting Judge’ Cardozo’s “foreseeable plaintiff” limit on duty. Id. ¶ 11, 829
P.2d at 649.
116. 2003-NMSC-018, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181.
117. Justice Pamela B. Minzner succeeded Justice Montgomery in 1994. Justice Petra Jimenez Maes
succeeded Justice Ransom in 1998. The Court that decided Herrera, was composed of these Justices and
Justices Richard C. Bosson and Patricio Serna. Justice Edward Chavez joined the Court in March 2003,
two months before the decision in Herrera but did not participate in its resolution.
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their body of work. The owner of a vehicle took it to Quality Pontiac for repairs. The
dealership instructed him to leave the keys in the car and the door unlocked. That
evening, a thief stole the car. The next day, police spotted the stolen vehicle and gave
chase, during which the thief collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle killing one occupant
and injuring another. The plaintiffs sued Quality Pontiac for negligence and the trial
court dismissed the case for failure of the complaint to state a valid claim.118
In an opinion authored by Justice Serna, the high court reversed the
judgment for Quality Pontiac, determined that Quality Pontiac owed the victims a
duty of due care,119 and remanded to the trial court to determine issues of breach and
proximate cause. The Court confirmed that both the foreseeable plaintiff test and
public policy were essential components of New Mexico’s duty analysis.120 Without
acknowledging Justice Ransom’s statement in Torres that the jury normally
determines the foreseeable plaintiff issue,121 Justice Serna ruled the issue was
reserved for the court to determine.122 The policy requirement was to be “answered
by reference to legal precedent, statutes and other principles of law.”123
The foreseeable plaintiff requirement posed an apparent barrier for the
plaintiffs, which they were able to overcome. Influenced by an expert’s affidavit
submitted by the plaintiffs,124 the Court overruled Bouldin v. Sategna,125 which had
held it was not foreseeable that leaving keys in an unattended, running vehicle would
result in the theft of a vehicle and subsequent traffic accident.126
The public policy component of duty confronted the Court with two
additional apparent barriers to the imposition of a duty of care on Quality Pontiac.
First, a statute requiring removal of car keys from a vehicle barred use of a violation
from being used in any civil action.127 The Supreme Court construed the statute
narrowly as providing only a bar to the admissibility of the violation of the statute in
civil litigation128 and not a legislative determination precluding a common law cause
of action for the same conduct.129 Finding that the Bouldin court primarily was
118. See Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 1, 73 P.3d at 185. When Plaintiffs appealed, the court of appeals
certified the matter to the Supreme Court. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(C) (1972).
119. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 32, 73 P.3d at 194.
120. Id. ¶¶ 10, 20, 73 P.3d at 187, 190.
121. See Torres, 1995-NMSC-025, ¶ 15, 894 P.2d at 390.
122. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 73 P.3d at 187 (quoting Calkins v. Cox Ests., 1990-NMSC-044,
¶ 5, 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36).
123. Id. ¶ 7, 73 P.3d at 186 (citation omitted).
124. Plaintiffs presented an expert’s affidavit providing data showing that leaving keys in unlocked
vehicles frequently led to theft, the accident rate in stolen vehicles was almost 200 times that of accidents
not involving stolen vehicles and “there is a high probability that a stolen car will be involved in traffic
accidents . . . hours or days after their theft . . . [often when] police pursuit was involved.” Id. ¶ 3, 73 P.3d
at 185 (quotations omitted).
125. Id. ¶ 18, 73 P.3d at 189.
126. Bouldin v. Sategna, 1963-NMSC-017, ¶ 17, 71 N.M. 339, 333, 378 P.2d 370, 373 (“We do not
perceive theft of a car as a natural event to be foreseen by a person who is negligent in leaving his car
unattended with the key in the ignition. Much less can it be believed that such a state of facts as gave rise
to the instant litigation could be remotely considered to be a natural or probable result of defendant’s
having left his car unlocked, or that they could have been reasonably foreseen.”).
127. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-353 (1978).
128. Herrera, 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d at 188 (emphasis added).
129. Id. ¶ 13, 73 P.3d at 188.
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concerned that under the then-existing doctrine of joint and several liability, the
vehicle owner could be held fully liable for damages caused in significant part by the
acts of the thief,130 the Herrera Court determined the subsequent adoption of
comparative fault in New Mexico alleviated that concern by making each tortfeasor
liable only for the percentage of fault attributable to its misconduct.131 Because the
adoption of comparative fault undercut the rationale for Bouldin, the Court overruled
Bouldin as “a mere remnant of an abandoned doctrine.”132 The Court concluded that
Quality Pontiac owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the
district court to resolve issues of breach and proximate cause.133
Justice Serna’s opinion demonstrated that the legacy left by Justices
Ransom and Montgomery could result in significant advancements of the law of duty
despite, and perhaps because, their efforts had not solidified into a unified
restructuring of the law of duty when they left the Court. His opinion wove strands
of both their views into an impressive decision that overturned a long-standing
precedent, firmly established that the existence of a duty is a question of law for the
court, and skillfully demonstrated that the change of New Mexico law from
contributory negligence to comparative fault constituted a shift in policy that called
for imposing a duty where a “no duty” rule had existed for forty years.
Justice Serna provided an additional insight that resonated in Justice
Bosson’s concurring opinion and in later cases. While policy concerns may come
into play with respect to both duty and proximate cause,134 the policies relevant to
duty creation deal with matters more “global and general in nature” while those
concerning proximate cause derive from a focus on “the specific facts of the
[particular] case.”135 This dichotomy undercuts the premise that to impose a duty,
the factfinder must analyze the specific facts of each case to determine whether the
plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of defendant’s conduct.136
Justice Bosson’s concurring opinion agreed with the majority’s reasoning
and result but went further in calling for a reconsideration of the role of the
“foreseeable plaintiff” requirement for determining whether a duty of care exists. He
noted criticism that it is merely a “legal fiction” used by New Mexico courts “for
restricting or expanding liability,”137 and conceded that “when we attempt to define
duty in terms of a foreseeable plaintiff, it is all too tempting to use ‘foreseeability’
as a surrogate for result-oriented conclusions.”138 He acknowledged that in Solon,
Justice Montgomery first suggested the Supreme Court should consider jettisoning

130. Id. ¶ 26, 73 P.3d at 193.
131. Id. ¶ 27, 73 P.3d at 193 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 29, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d
1234).
132. Id. ¶ 27, 73 P.3d at 193.
133. Id. ¶ 37, 73 P.3d at 196.
134. Id. ¶ 17, 73 P.3d at 189.
135. Id.
136. Justice Serna’s insight is reflected in Justice Bosson’s concurring opinion questioning the use of
the foreseeable plaintiff test as a consideration in determining the existence of a duty. See id. ¶¶ 40–41,
73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson J., concurring).
137. Id. ¶ 40, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., concurring) (quoting Nancy Desiderio, Tort Law—Evolution
of Duty in New Mexico: Torres v. State, 26 N.M. L. REV. 585, 585 (1996)).
138. Id. ¶ 42, 73 P.3d at 196 (Bosson, J., concurring).
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the test as a prerequisite for the imposition of a duty and pointedly noted “Justice
Montgomery’s query lingers.”139 Justice Bosson advanced several proposals the
Court should address for reforming existing New Mexico law,140 ending with the
“hope we will hear more of this issue in the future as attitudes change toward
Palsgraf.”141
Seven years later, that hope was partially fulfilled when the Court decided
Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque.142 In Edward C., a child was injured while
attending a baseball game at a city-owned baseball park. He was seated in a picnic
area beyond the left field fence in fair ball territory when, without warning, batting
practice began and the batter struck a ball over the fence that hit the two-year old
child.143 The parents sued the City and others for negligence144 claiming that, as a
visitor in the ballpark, the child was owed a duty of ordinary care.145
In the district court, the City conceded it owed a duty to the child146 but
argued that the court should modify the duty of care from ordinary care to require
only compliance with the “limited-duty baseball rule” that shrinks the duty of the
owner of a baseball park to only putting up screening in the area behind home
plate.147 The trial court sided with the City, ruled that the duty of ordinary care should
be superseded by the limited-duty baseball rule, and granted summary judgment for
the City.148 The court of appeals reversed, holding it was error to modify the general

139. Id. ¶ 40, 73 P.3d at 196 (citing Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 1992-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 10–11, 113 N.M.
566, 829 P.2d 645).
140. Justice Bosson noted the Court might consider abandoning the foreseeability test and impose a
universal duty of care, as Judge Andrews advocated in Palsgraf. Alternatively, perhaps there should be a
presumption that the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim that is overcome only if no reasonable jury could
find otherwise. He also invited consideration of Justice Ransom’s focus on legal and social policy as
possibly overriding the foreseeable plaintiff component of duty formation. Finally, he noted that a
currently circulating draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm, questioned
whether the foreseeable plaintiff requirement should continue as a component of duty formation or,
instead, become a consideration for the jury when determining proximate cause. See id. ¶¶ 40–43, 73 P.3d
at 196.
141. Id. ¶ 44, 73 P.3d at 197.
142. 2010-NMSC-043, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086.
143. The tables in the picnic area were perpendicular to the field of play and no screening protected
the picnickers from batted balls. In contrast, the City placed protective screening in in the area behind and
around home plate. Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 241 P.3d at 1088.
144. Other defendants were the home team Albuquerque Isotopes, the Houston Astros, and the
Houston player who struck the baseball. The district court granted summary judgment for the Houston
club and player, and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling. The Plaintiffs did not seek to overturn the
judgments in favor of the batter and the Astros. The Court did not distinguish between the City and the
Isotopes in its opinion.
145. “An [owner] . . . owes a visitor the duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for use by
the visitor.” UJI 13-1309 NMRA; Ordinary care “is that care which a reasonably prudent person would
use in the conduct of the person’s own affairs.” UJI 13-1603 NMRA.
146. “Defendants do not dispute that a duty is owed: they simply argue that the scope of that duty
should be limited.” Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 16, 241 P.3d at 1090.
147. The limited-duty baseball rule “is satisfied when the owner/occupant of a baseball stadium
provides a screened area behind home plate with adequate seating for those seeking protection.” Id. ¶ 10,
241 P.3d at 1089.
148. Id. ¶ 2, 241 P.3d at 1088.
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rule of ordinary care for visitors on land149 and ordered a remand for a trial to
determine whether the City breached the duty of ordinary care. In a unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Edward Chavez, the Supreme Court rejected the dutyowed formulations of both the district court and the court of appeals, adopted a third
iteration of the duty owed by the owner of a ballpark to a visitor, and remanded the
case to the district court for evaluation under the proper standard.150
The issue was not whether the City owed a duty to the plaintiffs but rather
the nature of the duty the City owed. The Court had occasionally modified the duty
a defendant owed from ordinary care to some other standard;151 indeed, it had done
so in the past when determining the duty owed by a land owner to persons on the
land.152 This time, Justice Chavez’s opinion for the Court found support for
modifying the statement of a duty owed in Section 7(b) of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts.153 The Restatement provides a new paradigm both for determining when a
duty is owed and, relevant to Edward C., for determining when it is appropriate to
diverge from the normal statement that the duty owed is reasonable or ordinary care.
Section 7(b) provides: “In exceptional circumstances, when an articulated
countervailing principle or policy warrants . . . limiting liability in a particular class
of cases, a court may decide that . . . the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires
modification.”154
The Restatement also makes clear that when a court modifies the duty of
reasonable care, it should identify and explain its concerns and the principles or
policies that lead it to provide an alternative formulation of the duty owed.155 The
Restatement Comments provide a thorough but not exclusive list of the
considerations that might justify modifying the normal duty of care.156 A significant
advantage of modifying the generic statement of the duty owed is that creation of
categorical exceptions to the general rule of ordinary care “has the benefit of
providing clearer rules of behavior for actors . . . who structure their behavior in
response to that potential liability.”157
After a thorough review of the history and development of various baseball
rules,158 and of the abolition of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk

149. Id. ¶ 3, 241 P.3d at 1088.
150. Id. ¶ 45, 241 P.3d at 1098.
151. E.g., Kabella v. Bouschelle, 1983-NMCA-125, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (using a different
standard for contact sports); UJI 13-1104(B) NMRA (doctor’s duty to inform patient must include specific
categories of information).
152. See Ford v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cty. of Dona Ana, 1994-NMSC-077, 118 N.M. 134, 879
P.2d 766 (describing different duties owed by a landlord to invitees, licensees and trespassers, equating
the duty owed to “visitors,” and maintaining a separate statement of the duty owed a trespasser).
153. See 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 21, P.3d at 1092 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. i (2010).
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b).
155. Id. § 7 cmt. a.
156. Id. § 7 cmts. c–g.
157. Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 21, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt.
i.).
158. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 22–39, 241 P.3d at 1092–97.
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as complete defenses,159 the Edward C. Court concluded that owners of commercial
baseball stadiums “owe a duty to their fans that is justifiably limited given the unique
nature of their relationship, as well as the policy concerns implicated by this
relationship.”160 Based on these considerations, the Court crafted its own unique
modification of the duty owed baseball fans by owners of commercial stadiums:
“Spectators must exercise ordinary care to protect themselves from the inherent risk
of being hit by a projectile that leaves the field of play and the owner/occupant must
exercise ordinary care not to increase that inherent risk.”161
Edward C. is important for three reasons. First, the Court’s approving
references to a portion of Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) signaled openness to
adopting the entirety of Section 7 of Restatement (Third), which would radically
transform the law of duty creation. Second, the Court approved the use of public
policy considerations to modify the statement of the duty owed, thus affording the
Court flexibility to determine that a duty was owed while adjusting the duty owed to
reflect policy concerns that did not alone justify the denial of a duty. Third, the
flexibility also allowed the Court to impose a duty but modify the duty owed in light
of policy considerations that “might escape the jury’s attention in a particular case,
such as the overall social impact of imposing a significant precautionary obligation
on a class of actors.”162
Four years after Edward C., the Supreme Court completed its fundamental
revamping of the law of duty in Rodriguez v. Del Sol Shopping Center Associates,
L.P.163 Customers in a store in a shopping center died and were injured when a driver
lost control of her vehicle in the parking lot and crashed into the store. In two
lawsuits, Plaintiffs sued the owners and operators of the shopping center, alleging
they negligently failed to take adequate precautions to prevent out-of-control
vehicles from encroaching into the store. The trial courts granted summary judgment
for Defendants, finding that the accident was not foreseeable as a matter of law, and
thus the shopping center owed no duty of care to the Plaintiffs.164 Plaintiffs
appealed,165 and the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgments. The court
rejected the trial courts’ reliance on a foreseeability analysis to deny the existence of
a duty but affirmed the absence of a duty, purportedly on the basis of “a policy-driven
duty analysis advanced by the Restatement (Third) of Torts . . . and recently
embraced . . . in Edward C.” 166

159. Id. ¶ 27, 241 P.3d at 1094.
160. Id. ¶ 40, 241 P.3d at 1097.
161. Id. ¶ 41, 241 P.3d at 1098.
162. Id. ¶ 21, 241 P.3d at 1091. The Court noted a compensating benefit for defendants from the
diminishment of the jury’s normal broad freedom to determine breach: “Such a categorical determination
. . . has the benefit of providing clearer rules of behavior for actors who may be subject to tort liability
and who structure their behavior in response to the potential liability.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010)).
163. 2014-NMSC-014, 326 P.3d 465.
164. Id. ¶ 2, 326 P.3d at 467.
165. The court of appeals consolidated the two appeals. Id. ¶ 3, 326 P.3d at 468.
166. Id.
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The Supreme Court adopted the entirety of Section 7 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts,167 which bars foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff from
consideration when determining if a duty is owed.168 The Court “expressly [held]
that foreseeability is not a factor for courts to consider when determining the
existence of a duty,” and is likewise not relevant “when deciding to limit . . . an
existing duty in a particular class of cases,”169 holding further that “[f]oreseeability
determinations are reserved for a jury because such determinations require the jury’s
common sense, common experience, and its consideration of community behavioral
norms.”170
The Court’s embrace of the Restatement (Third) approach to duty formation
has the effect of adopting a portion of Judge Andrew’s approach to duty in his
Palsgraf dissent where he stated, “Every one owes to the world at large the duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. . . .
Harm to someone being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all
those injured may complain.”171 Section 7(a) of the Restatement (Third) adopts this
as the presumptive test for whether a duty is owed: “An actor ordinarily has a duty
to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical
harm.”172 Policy issues remain a critical factor in determining whether a duty is
owed. Instead of searching for a policy justification for imposing a duty, however,
courts will focus on whether policy issues justify overcoming the presumption of a
duty 173 “to exercise ordinary care.”174

167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (AM. L.
INST. 2010).
168. “A no-duty ruling represents a determination, a purely legal question [applicable] in a category
of cases . . . based on articulated policies or principles . . . These reasons of policy and principle do not
depend on the foreseeability of harm based on the specific facts of the case. They should be articulated
directly without obscuring references to foreseeability.” Id. cmt. j.
169. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 1, 326 P.3d at 467. The Court overruled that portion of Edward
C. “which noted that foreseeability plays some role, although it is limited, in the determination of duty.”
Id. ¶ 3, 326 P.3d at 467.
170. Id. ¶ 22, 326 P.3d at 473.
171. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E, 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. L.
INST. 2010).
173. Id. § 7(b). Edward C. had already ruled that when a defendant owes a duty, the duty is one of
ordinary care unless policy considerations justify a different formulation of the duty owed. Edward C. v.
City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 20, 21, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086.
174. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 326 P.3d at 468–69. The defendant has the procedural burden
to raise the issue and to demonstrate that the court should not impose a duty or should modify the usual
statement of the duty owed. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). The Court provided examples from prior New Mexico cases where
the court of appeals properly applied policy considerations in determining duty issues. Rodriguez, 2014NMSC-014, ¶¶ 8–11, 326 P.3d at 469–70. The Court also considered whether Justice Ransom’s concept
of remoteness would be a valid policy to apply to deny or limit a duty but concluded that it was not because
“remoteness often leads toward a discussion of the facts in a particular case; insofar as it does so, it is not
a discussion of policy.” Id. ¶ 13, 326 P.3d at 470–71. The Court reemphasized that “no duty based upon
the foreseeability, improbability, or remote nature of the risk” is inconsistent with the Court’s adoption of
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD). Id.
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In adopting Section 7 of the Restatement (Third), the Court abolished
foreseeability as a factor in determining duty but reaffirmed its continuing
importance in determining if a defendant breached the duty of care.175 In New
Mexico, foreseeability also may play a role in the jury’s determination of proximate
cause.176
4. Summary of the Duty Issue
Justices Ransom and Montgomery learned from, questioned, and built upon
the efforts of Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in the Palsgraf case. Just as the
New York judges disagreed respectfully while presenting sharply divergent views of
the law of duty, Justices Ransom and Montgomery did the same. Always in the spirit
of colleagues sharing a common goal but often not agreeing as to the proper course
to follow, they sometimes proposed different solutions. But the one constant was that
each thoughtfully considered the views of the other and displayed an openness to
modify his view in the face of persuasive arguments presented by the other.
That they did not always agree, just as Cardozo and Andrews did not, is not
surprising, but their joint efforts exposed the core issues and policies that underlie
the law of duty. They debated the role of foreseeability in duty formation, firmly
established that policy factors were crucial to duty formation, ultimately forged a
consensus about the source of the relevant policies, and discussed whether the jury
should have a role in determining duty creation. Justice Montgomery introduced the
idea that Judge Andrews’ universal duty of care might be the norm, thus eliminating
foreseeability issues from duty creation, an insight central to Section 7 of the
Restatement (Third) and adopted in Rodriguez. That some of their positions
ultimately were rejected in Edward C. and Rodriguez does not diminish the value of
their contributions to the development of the New Mexico law.177 Their efforts, and
the contributions of their colleagues on the Court, were essential to the ultimate
transformation of New Mexico law that began with Calkins and culminated in
Rodriguez. 178

175. Rodriguez, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 19, 326 P.3d at 473.
176. UJI 13-306 NMRA.
177. In Rodriguez, for example, Justice Chavez concluded that Justice Ransom’s doctrine of
remoteness, which Justice Ransom characterized as a policy, actually compelled a determination of the
facts of each case and thus was inconsistent with the exclusion of fact issues in determining duty. 2014NMSC-014, ¶ 13, 326 P.3d at 470–71.
178. The transformation of the common law in this area necessarily remains an ongoing process. In
Morris v. Giant Four Corners, Inc., the Court recently concluded the vendor of gasoline at a gas station
owed a duty of reasonable care to decline to sell gasoline to the driver of a vehicle who the vendor
“know[s] or has reason to know is intoxicated.” 2021-NMSC-028, ¶ 47, 498 P.3d 238. Dissenting, Justice
Barbara Vigil argued that application of the standard is unclear in its scope and application. Id. ¶ 77, 498
P.3d at 259 (Vigil, J., dissenting). The majority opinion conceded that determining whether the vendor
failed to exercise reasonable care may be difficult but is “left for the jury in individual cases. Id. ¶ 46, 498
P.3d at 252–53.
Neither opinion in Morris considered the solution adopted in Edward C.—that a duty may be
imposed, but the statement of the duty may be modified for policy reasons. Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043,
¶ 4, 241 P.3d at 648. Imposing a duty but modifying the standard of care from “knew or should have
known” to, perhaps, “knew or acted with utter indifference to the consequences.” See UJI 13-1827 NMRA
(defining reckless conduct in the punitive damage instruction), might have addressed Justice Vigil’s
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B.

The Jurisdiction of the New Mexico Appellate Courts and the Tension
between Certainty and Flexibility in the Law

One might expect little debate about whether an appellate court has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal, whether the legislature or the courts can regulate the
process for gaining access to an appellate court, and whether courts can forgive an
appealing party who fails to follow strictly the requirements governing the filing of
an appeal. Yet, in a series of cases, Justices Montgomery and Ransom engaged in an
extended dialogue concerning these issues, demonstrating their differing
commitment to the values of certainty and flexibility in this area of the law.
The New Mexico Constitution mandates exclusive Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction in only one narrow category of cases.179 It empowers the legislature,
however, to confer additional appellate jurisdiction to both the Supreme Court and
the court of appeals.180 In turn, the Supreme Court has an inherent power to adopt
Rules of procedure that govern the operation of all New Mexico courts,181 which
includes matters that relate to the process for obtaining appellate review.182 The
constitution also grants the Supreme Court “superintending control over all inferior
courts,” and authority to issue “writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise
of its jurisdiction.”183
Inevitably, these overlapping provisions—involving the constitution,
statutes, and court Rules—create tension between the Court and the legislature
concerning the power of each in determining appellate jurisdiction and in resolving
their respective roles in crafting non-jurisdictional provisions for perfecting appeals.
After a brief summary of the historical developments leading to the current structure
dealing with appellate jurisdiction, this section analyzes the cases in which Justices
concerns by providing a standard that would appropriately cabin the range of conduct that could lead to
liability for vendors under the unusual circumstances of this case.
179. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction over criminal cases
imposing sentence of death or life imprisonment). Provisions in the 1911 constitution addressing appellate
court jurisdiction were substantially amended in 1965, when the constitution authorized creation of the
New Mexico Court of Appeals. For a discussion of the 1965 changes, see infra notes 196–203 and
accompanying text.
180. The constitution provides that additional appellate jurisdiction shall be “as provided by law.” See
N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (granting such jurisdiction to the Supreme Court); id., § 29 (granting such
jurisdiction to the court of appeals). The phrase empowers the legislature to determine appellate
jurisdiction. State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 821, 823 (“The phrase ‘as may be
provided by law’ means that our Constitution or Legislature must vest us with appellate jurisdiction—we
cannot create jurisdiction ourselves through our rule-making authority.”); New Mexico v. Armijo, 2016NMSC-021, ¶ 19, 375 P.3d 415, 420 (“A court’s jurisdiction derives from a statute or constitutional
provision. . . . The right to appeal is also a matter of substantive law created by constitutional or statutory
provision.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
181. State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, 40 N.M. 395, 60 P.2d 646; see Michael B. Browde & M. E.
Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for
Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M. L. REV. 407 (1985).
182. Rule 12-101(A) NMRA (2016) (“These rules govern procedure in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals.”).
183. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see, e.g., Rhein v. ADT Auto., Inc., 1996-NMSC-066, ¶ 11, 122 N.M.
646, 930 P.2d 783 (using superintending control authority to allow an immediate appeal to the court of
appeals from the district court to allow that case to be consolidated with a similar case then pending in the
appeals court).

Summer 2022 A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

455

Ransom and Montgomery engaged in their extensive debates arising from these
intersecting realms of authority. The section concludes with a summary of the
justices’ contributions to the later-developed law of appellate jurisdiction.
1.

The Historical Developments Leading to the Current Structure
Regarding Appellate Jurisdiction

The federal Organic Act establishing the Territory of New Mexico184 served
as a surrogate constitution of the territory prior to statehood,185 and Section 10 of the
Act gave the Supreme Court appellate authority over “final decisions” of the district
courts, “under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. . . . “186
New Mexico’s first constitution, adopted in 1911, retained from the Organic
Act the grant to the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over final judgments
from the district court.187 It also provided that the Court “shall have such appellate
jurisdiction of interlocutory orders188 as may be conferred by law”—that is, enacted
by the legislature. 189 The constitution further authorized the Supreme Court to issue
a variety of writs and provided that the Court “shall have a superintending control”
over all inferior courts.190
The growth of the state’s population and the resulting increase in litigation
created concern for the Supreme Court’s ability to satisfy the appellate needs of the
judiciary.191 In the early 1960s, a Constitutional Revision Commission was created
to recommend constitutional changes, including a proposal for adoption of an
intermediate appellate court, and led to a debate over whether the constitution should
delegate to the legislature or to the Supreme Court the power to set the jurisdiction
of the appellate courts.192 One side endorsed the view of the Model Judicial Article
for State Constitutions, supported by the American Bar Association and the

184. Act of September 9, 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446.
185. See In re Attorney-General of New Mexico, 1881-NMSC-001, ¶ 28, 2 N.M. 49, 58 (“In a territory
the constitution and laws of the United States and especially the organic act of the territory itself, stands
exactly in the relation a state constitution occupies in a state.”).
186. Act of September 9, 1850, ch. 49 9 Stat. 446, 450.
187. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1911) (“The appellate jurisdiction of the New Mexico Supreme Court
… shall extend to all final judgments and decisions of the district courts….”).
188. Id. This provision overcame the ruling of the Territorial Supreme Court in Jung v. Myer, 1902NMSC-013, 11 N.M. 378, that the Organic Act precluded Supreme Court jurisdiction over interlocutory
orders.
189. See supra note 180.
190. N.M. CONST. art. VI, §3. The provision also gave the Court original jurisdiction over writs of quo
warranto and mandamus. Id.
191. The need giving rise to the 1965 constitutional amendment creating the New Mexico Court of
Appeals is explained in Thomas A. Donnelly & Pamela B. Minzner, History of the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, 22 N.M. L. REV. 595, 596 (1992).
192. For a further discussion of the details of that debate, see Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note
6 at 233.

456

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

American Judicature Society,193 providing that state supreme courts should
“prescribe rules governing appellate jurisdiction.”194
Counsel to the Revision Commission, however, disagreed and presented a
draft to the state senate that adhered to the jurisdiction “as provided by law” principle
that was first articulated in the Organic Act and continued in the 1911 constitution
delegating the task to the legislature.195 That proposal, retaining the authority over
appellate jurisdiction in the legislature, became enshrined in the 1965 Constitutional
amendment to the judicial article.196 The amendment also created the court of
appeals197 and described the relation of the court of appeals to the Supreme Court.198
As a result, the Supreme Court no longer has appellate jurisdiction over all
appeals from final judgments of the district court. As noted earlier, the constitution
grants the high Court direct and exclusive review only of district court judgments
imposing a sentence of death or life in prison.199 For all other cases appealed from
the district court, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is set by the legislature,
with one critical limitation on the plenary legislative authority: In 1965, for the first
time, the legislature’s power was circumscribed by a new constitutional command
that “an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.”200 The 1965
amendments also left unchanged the Supreme Court’s “superintending control” over
inferior courts and its authority to issue “all writs necessary or proper for the
complete exercise of its jurisdiction.”201
The 1965 amendments eliminated the requirement in the 1911 Constitution
limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to final judgments.202 Only
in Article VI, Section 27, governing appeals from inferior courts to the district court,
is there now a constitutional provision limiting appellate jurisdiction to final

193. See id. at 229, suggesting that the ABA and the Judicature Society efforts were intended to protect
judicial independence and to “insulate them from legislative meddling” in the wake of recent
Congressional attempts to limit U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction in the Warren Court era.
194. Id. The Model Judicial Article allocated broad powers to state supreme courts “to prescribe rules
governing appellate jurisdiction, rules of practice and procedure, and rules of evidence for the judicial
system.” Id. In doing so, it evoked the similar national debate over the proper allocation of procedural
rule-making power between the legislature and the courts led by Dean Roscoe Pound during the early
years of the 20th century. See generally Browde & Occhialino, supra note 181.
195. Montgomery & Montgomery, supra note 6 at 230.
196. N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2 (amended 1965), 27 (amended 1966).
197. Id. § 28 (amended 1965).
198. Id. § 2 (amended 1965).
199. Id.
200. Article VI, Section 2’s grant of an “absolute right to one appeal” is focused on direct appeals
from the district court to an appellate court. Article VI, Section 27, however, provides: “Appeals shall be
allowed in all cases from the final judgments and decisions of the probate courts and other inferior courts
as provided by law.” Pursuant to this authority, the legislature has provided that appeals from magistrate
court go to the district court, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-1 (1975). Most appeals of civil cases brought in
metropolitan court go to the court of appeals. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-6(B) (1979). Appeals from the
metropolitan court in actions brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act are brought
in the district court. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-8A-6(C) (2019). The constitutional right to appeal does not
include an appeal from a district court acting in its appellate jurisdiction. VanderVossen v. City of
Espanola, 2001-NMCA-016, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 287, 24 P.3d 319.
201. N.M CONST. art. VI, § 3.
202. Compare N.M. CONST. art VI, § 3 (1911), with current N.M, CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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judgments and final decisions.203 However, the legislature may, and has, with limited
exceptions,204 imposed a statutory final judgment/final decision requirement when
exercising constitutional authority to determine appellate jurisdiction not explicitly
provided for in the constitution.205
Article VI, Section 29, expressly grants the legislature authority to
determine the appellate jurisdiction of the newly created court of appeals, including
jurisdiction to review decisions of administrative agencies.206 It also allows the
Supreme Court by Rule to authorize the court of appeals to issue writs in aid of the
court’s appellate jurisdiction.207 These constitutional provisions from the 1965
amendments provide the current framework for determining the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the court of appeals. Although there are a few
constitutional jurisdictional requirements that cannot be modified by the
legislature,208 or through rule-making by the Supreme Court, most authority over
appellate jurisdiction continues to reside in the legislature.209
The constitution’s delegation to the legislature the power to determine the
jurisdiction of the appellate courts is in tension with a different strand of New Mexico
law—that authorizing the Supreme Court to write procedural Rules controlling the
course of lawsuits, including appeals. Many of the appellate jurisdiction issues
confronting Justices Ransom and Montgomery involved the intersection between
constitutionally-authorized legislative power over appellate jurisdiction and the
Court’s rule-making power, which extends to appellate court Rules. The question
often involves which statutory provisions set jurisdictional requirements for, or
limitations on, appellate court jurisdiction, and which simply provide procedures for
203. “Appeals shall be allowed in all cases from the final judgment and decisions of the probate courts
and other inferior courts as provided by law.” N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 27.
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (1999) (granting interlocutory order appeals from district court); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3(A)(2–3) (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. 39-3-3(B)(1–2) (1999) (granting certain nonfinal orders in criminal cases); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-7 (1999) (granting interlocutory appeals in special
statutory proceedings).
205. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-3-1.1(C) (1999) (granting appeal of final decisions from some
agency decisions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (1966) (appeals of final civil judgments in district court),
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3 (A)(1) (1972) (granting appeals of final criminal judgments in district court).
206. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29.
207. Id.
208. E.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (direct appeal to Supreme Court of district court opinions imposing
sentence of death or life imprisonment); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (original jurisdiction over writs); N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 27 (“appeals shall be allowed in all cases from final judgments and decisions” of inferior
courts.).
209. With respect to the court of appeals, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-8 (1983) (granting and
identifying broad areas of court of appeals jurisdiction); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (1966) (granting civil
appeals from district court); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3 (1972) (granting appeals from district court in
criminal cases); N.M. STAT. ANN. Sec, 39-3-4 (1999) (granting most appeals of interlocutory orders from
district court); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-7 (1966) (granting appeals from district court in special statutory
proceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-15 (1966) (granting most appeals of district court judgments for
civil or criminal contempt and grants of habeas corpus petitions); N.M. STAT. ANN. §39-3-1.1 (1999)
(granting discretionary review of district court judgments that determine appeals from agency decisions).
With respect to the Supreme Court, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(A) (1972) (granting the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to all cases where appellate jurisdiction is not specifically vested
by law in the court of appeals.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(B) (1972) (granting review of court of
appeals decision by writ of certiorari).
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perfecting appeals where jurisdiction exists. The former are the domain of the
legislature; the latter are ultimately the responsibility of the Supreme Court.
Since the 1930s, the Supreme Court and the legislature have sparred over
the relationship between the Court’s rule-making power over matters of procedure
and the legislature’s power to enact statutes containing procedural provisions
applicable in the judicial process.210 The current Rule provisions that potentially
clash with statutory jurisdictional authority include:
Rule 12-202 (A) states a notice of appeal shall be filed in the
district court within the time limit set in Rule 12-201, which requires a notice of
appeal be filed within thirty days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed
from.211 Rule 12-201 (E) provides for motions seeking limited extensions of the
thirty-day filing requirement.212
Rule 12-202 (B) and (C) set forth the required content of the notice
of appeal, and Rule 12-202(E) requires that the appellant give notice of filing the
notice of appeal to listed persons.
Rule 12-312 (C) provides that an appeal filed within the time set
by the Rules shall not be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202 that do
not affect the substantive rights of the parties.213
As a result, of these cross currents of authority, the Ransom-Montgomery
dialogue ultimately involves differences over the following questions:
What is meant by the term appellate “jurisdiction” the constitution
grants and the creation of which the constitution delegates to the legislature to
determine?
What requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of the appellate
courts are truly jurisdictional and compel dismissal of the appeal if not complied
with?
What requirements for appealing are not jurisdictional but merely
provide procedures for perfecting appeals?

210. E.g., State v. Roy, 1936-NMSC-048, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646; Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354; State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 1975-NMSC-032,
88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006; see generally Browde & Occhialino, supra note 181.
Alterations in the rule-making authority have added to the confusion. The 1974 version of the
appellate Rules for civil appeals applied “[e]xcept . . . as may be otherwise provided by law” and added
that the Rules “shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the appellate courts as provided
by law.” Rule 21-12-1(a)–(b) NMRA. In 1983, the legislature authorized the Court to provide a Rule
allocating jurisdiction between the Court and the court of appeals. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-8 (2007).
The Court did so, listing appeals that would go to the Supreme Court and providing that all other appeals
would go to the court of appeals unless the Constitution or a “specific provision of state law” provided
differently. N.M. Sup Ct. Order No. 80000 Misc. (April 21, 1983). Then, in a more comprehensive 1986
Rules revision, the language in the 1983 order was fundamentally modified. It no longer provided that the
Supreme Court’s allocation of jurisdiction could be modified only by the constitution or legislation.
Instead, Rule 12-102 stated that Supreme Court jurisdiction could be modified “by the New Mexico
Constitution or by supreme court order or Rule.” Rule 12-102 (A)(6) NMRA (emphasis added).
211. Some appeals in criminal cases must be filed within 10 days after the decision or order is filed in
the district court. Rule 12-201(A)(1) NMRA.
212. Rule 12-201(E) NMRA. In addition, Rule 12-201(D) NMRA provides for extension of the time
for filing a notice of appeal when a party files certain post-judgment motions.
213. Rule 12-312 (C) NMRA.
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May the Supreme Court supersede non-jurisdictional statutory
procedural requirements by adopting a contrary court Rule?
Must New Mexico courts insist on strict compliance with nonjurisdictional statutory or Rule requirements for appealing or can the courts excuse
non-compliance and allow the appeal to proceed? If so, what are the criteria for doing
so?
2.

The Ransom-Montgomery Cases

Shortly after Justice Montgomery joined the Court, he and Justice Ransom
played pivotal roles as the Court decided the following flurry of cases attempting to
define the “jurisdiction” of the appellate courts.214
a.

Maples v. State (Conflicts Between Statutes and Rules)

Maples v. State,215 involved an appeal of an award in a Workers’
Compensation proceeding. A statute authorized an appeal within thirty days after the
hearing officer mailed the final order to the parties.216 An applicable court Rule
required that notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the filing of the order.217
The petitioner missed the filing date required by the Rule but met the statutory
requirement. Resolution of the matter engendered separate opinions from Justice
Baca,218 Justice Ransom, and Justice Montgomery concerning the relationship
between procedural statutes and procedural Rules.
Justice Baca avoided a conflict between the statute and the Rule by
concluding that after the hearing officer entered the final order, the statutes dealing

214. Justices Ransom and Montgomery first sparred over the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction
of the district courts in Sundance Mechanical & Util. Co. v. Atlas, 1990-NMSC-031, 109 N.M. 683, 789
P.2d 1250. One issue in Sundance was whether a pleading that fails to state a valid cause of action is a
jurisdictional defect even if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Id. ¶ 1, 789 P.2d at
1251. New Mexico precedent identified three jurisdictional prerequisites for district court jurisdiction:
“jurisdiction of parties, jurisdiction of subject matter and power or authority to decide the particular matter
presented.” Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 1969-NMSC-017, ¶ 12, 77 N.M. 369, 371, 423 P.2d 410, 412
(1967). Justice Montgomery’s opinion for the Court eliminated the third requirement because if subject
matter jurisdiction exists, “the jurisdiction of a district court does not depend on how the court decides a
contested issue submitted to it; the test ‘is whether or not it had the power to enter upon the inquiry, not
whether its conclusion . . . was right or wrong.’” Sundance, 1990-NMSC-031, ¶ 15, 789 P.2d at 1254. In
a special concurrence, Justice Ransom expressed a preference for maintaining the third requirement: “I
would not abandon so quickly the principle that a court lacks power to grant relief on a complaint that
fails to state a cause of action.” Id. ¶ 37, 789 P.2d at 1259 (Ransom, J., concurring). The opinions of
Justice Montgomery and Justice Ransom set the stage for later cases in which they would agree, disagree,
and sometimes revise their views on the scope and limits of jurisdictional requirements on appellate
jurisdiction.
215. Maples v. State, 1990-NMSC-042, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788.
216. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-5-8(A) (1989).
217. Maples, ¶ 2, 791 P.2d at 789; see Rule 12-601(B) NMRA (notice of appeal must be filed within
thirty (30) days “from the date of the order.”).
218. Justice Baca’s separate opinion fully engaged with Justices Ransom and Montgomery over the
legislature’s and the court’s role with respect to judicial procedures. See Maples, ¶¶ 1–12, 791 P.2d at
788–91.
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with administrative procedures were no longer applicable.219 The Court’s Rules then
take effect.220 Nonetheless, he interjected dictum that occasioned separate opinions
from Justice Ransom and Justice Montgomery. Citing Ammerman v. Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc.,221 Justice Baca stated, “The legislature has no power to fix the
time within which an appeal must be heard by the supreme court in appeals from the
district court” nor “to set the time for all appeals from final orders including appeals
from final orders of administrative agencies.”222
Justice Ransom disagreed with Justice Baca’s statement that the legislature
has no role. Instead, he expressed “strong accord” with the doctrine embodied in
Ammerman, and reiterated in a subsequent case, that the legislature and the Court
share rule-making power but “any conflict between court Rules and statutes that
relate to procedure are today resolved by the Court in favor of the Rules.”223
Unlike Justice Baca’s categorical rejection of any role for the legislature in
determining procedures applicable to the courts,224 Justice Montgomery perceived a
role for the legislature in drafting procedural statues: “[S]ome sort of role-sharing
between courts and legislatures is both necessary and beneficial.”225 A contrary view,
Justice Montgomery declared, would be “pernicious in that it arrogates to the
judiciary a power which is unnecessary to the maintenance of the judiciary’s position
as a co-equal branch of government.”226
Unlike Justice Ransom, Justice Montgomery did not endorse the view that
Ammerman required that every conflict between a procedural statute and a
procedural Rule must be resolved in favor the Court’s Rule.227 Instead, if conflict
219. Id. ¶ 10, 791 P.2d at 790 (“An appeal from a final order to the judiciary is necessarily the point
at which the judicial branch gains jurisdiction. When it does, it is inherently within the power of the court
to set its own time limitations for appeals.”).
220. Id.
221. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Co. 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354, cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978).
222. Maples, 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 10, 791 P.2d at 790 (emphasis added). Justice Baca also noted that
Rule 12-601, dealing with statutory appeals to an appellate court from agency decisions, was amended in
1986 to provide explicitly that the Rule supersedes any inconsistent statute providing for the time or other
procedures for filing or perfecting an appeal. Id. ¶ 8, 791 P.2d at 790.
Justice Baca also provided an alternative, less sweeping, rationale for choosing the Rule rather
than the statute. When resolving conflicts concerning the time for filing appeals, he stated “a rule adopted
by the supreme court supersedes an inconsistent statute.” Id. ¶ 2, 791 P.2d at 788 (citing American Auto.
Assoc. v. State, 1985-NMSC-037, ¶ 4, 102 N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946) (“[O]n procedural matters such as
time limitations for appeals, a rule adopted by the Supreme Court governs over an inconsistent statute.”).
223. Id. ¶ 15, 791 P.2d at 791 (Ransom, J., dissenting) (quoting Southwest Community Health Services
v. Smith, 1988-NMSC-035, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 196, 755 P.2d 40). This view is consistent with Justice Baca’s
alternative ruling that court Rules trump inconsistent statutory procedural provisions. Id. ¶ 2, 791 P.2d at
788; see supra note 222.
224. See Maples, 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 10, 791 P.2d at 790.
225. Id. ¶ 21 (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905, 926–27 (1976)).
226. Id. ¶ 20, 791 P.2d at 792.
227. Id. ¶ 24, 791 P.2d at 794; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 (1966)(legislature acknowledges Court
the has power to write procedural rules); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-2 (1953) (“All statutes relating to
pleading, practice and procedure, now existing, shall, from and after the passage of this act, have force
and effect only as rules of court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules
promulgated pursuant hereto.”).
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exits, the choice between the statute and the Rule should be resolved on a case-bycase basis.228
Where an arguably “procedural,” statute actually implements a policy
external to the functioning of the courts,229 the choice between the statute and the
Rule should be resolved “by referring to the purpose of the particular statute and the
extent of intrusion upon the courts’ ability to discharge their functions.”230 The Court
should respect the legislature’s policy choice unless the statute “deprives the court
of ‘sufficient power to protect itself from indignities and to enable it effectively to
administer its judicial functions.’”231 Finding “no great clash of competing
interests,”232 Justice Montgomery concluded that the statutory time limit should
control over the contrary Rule, in part because the petitioner’s constitutional right to
appeal would be fostered by application of the statutory accrual date to determine
timeliness.233
Justice Montgomery carved out an exception to this general rule when the
statutory provision places a limit on the jurisdiction of appellate courts, a topic that
would become the subject of a continuing dialogue with Justice Ransom. He
acknowledged that statutory steps required to be followed in perfecting an appeal
may sometimes provide limits on the appellate court’s jurisdiction;234 such statutes
are not subject to modification by Court Rule or relaxation by courts in their
discretion.235 Justice Montgomery identified some statutory subjects that are

228. Maples, 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 21, 791 P.2d at 793 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
229. Id. ¶ 25, 791 P.2d at 794. Justice Montgomery cited Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 1976NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 and Southwest Community Health Services v. Smith, 107 N.M.
196, 755 P.2d 40 (1988)—both dealing with statutory evidentiary privileges—as statutes that may pursue
policies not solely directed to the essential working of the courts. Id.
230. Maples, 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 21, 791 P.2d at 793 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
231. Id. ¶ 25, 791 P.2d at 794 (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (quoting State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood,
1957-NMSC-071, ¶ 19, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223). Justice Montgomery derived two corollaries from
Bliss: The first is that the Court may strike legislation that may undercut its ability to perform its essential
functions. The second is that the court may negate statutory procedures which interfere with the effective
and efficient operation of the courts. Id.
232. Id. ¶ 27, 791 P.2d at 795 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
233. See id. ¶ 28, 791 P.2d at 795 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
234. Id. ¶ 27, 791 P.2d at 795 (Montgomery, J., dissenting).
235. Id. In dictum, Justice Montgomery introduced a concept and a vocabulary that exemplified a
continuing discussion in subsequent cases. Citing State v. Arnold, 1947-NMSC-043, 51 N.M. 311, 314,
183 P.2d 845, 846 (1947), he acknowledged that only the legislature can create a right to appeal. Maples,
1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 27, 791 P.2d at 795 (Montgomery, J., dissenting). But he temporized when discussing
whether all statutory provisions addressing the requirements for implementing the right to appeal are
themselves jurisdictional: “It is generally held that the timely filing of an appeal, perhaps along with other
steps necessary to perfect it is ‘jurisdictional.’” Id. (emphasis added). Jurisdictional statutory provisions
that affect the right to appeal “in a fundamental way . . . it would seem” should control over court Rules
which purport to regulate the manner for exercising the right to appeal. Id. (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional236 and considerations that might distinguish jurisdictional statutes from
those that the Court may supersede by a contrary Rule or forgive compliance with.237
Maples set the stage for two debates that mark the Ransom-Montgomery
dialogue about appellate court jurisdiction. First, it pits Justice Ransom’s
straightforward principle that conflicts between procedural statutes and Rules must
be resolved in favor of the Rule, against Justice Montgomery’s ad-hoc, policyoriented approach to determining whether deference should be given to legislative
procedural provisions over contrary procedural Rules. Second, it raises the question
of how to determine what provisions in a statute are jurisdictional mandates beyond
the power of the Court to modify and which are merely procedural provisions that
guide the process by which the parties present the appeal to the Court. Both debates
continue in the cases that follow.
b.

Lowe v. Bloom (Is Place of Filing Jurisdictional?)

In Lowe v. Bloom,238 the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from a
final judgment granting the appellee summary judgment. The notice of appeal
contained the required copy of the judgment appealed from and was sent to those
required to receive it. But the appellant filed the notice of appeal in the court of
appeals instead of the district court as required by the applicable Rule.239 The
appellee moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court had previously decided that the timely filing of a notice
of appeal in accordance with the Court’s Rules was a jurisdictional requirement for
obtaining appellate review.240 Lowe presented a different issue: whether the place of
filing the notice of appeal, as required by Rule 12-202(A), is also a jurisdictional
prerequisite for appealing a district court judgment. Challenging the motion to
dismiss the appeal, the appellant contended that he “substantially complied with the
requirements of the appellate rules, that appellees’ substantive rights have not been
prejudiced, and that his mistake constituted a technical violation of Rule 12-202
which, under Rule 12-312 should not result in dismissal of his appeal.”241
Justices Ransom and Montgomery differed sharply in their responses to that
argument. Writing for a four justice majority, Justice Ransom confirmed that
compliance with the Rule setting the time for filing was a jurisdictional
236. Justice Montgomery acknowledged that the creation of a right to appeal is outside the province
of the Court’s rule making power and that New Mexico cases have held that “the timely filing of an appeal,
perhaps along with other steps necessary to perfect it, is ‘jurisdictional.’” 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 27, 791
P.2d at 795.
237. 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 24, 791 P.2d at 794 (Montgomery, J., dissenting). Justice Montgomery
identified considerations that might raise a procedural statute beyond a “housekeeping rule” thus not
subject to modification by a Court Rule or subject to relaxation by a court —jurisdictional statutes,
procedural statutes seeking to accomplish substantive goals, and procedural statutes that impair courts
from carrying out their ability to carry out their fundamental functions. Id.
238. 1990-NMSC-069, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156.
239. Rule 12-202(A) NMRA.
240. See State v. Brinkley, 1967-NMSC-124, ¶ 4, 78 N.M. 39, 428 P.2d 13 (“[T]he notice of appeal
was filed on the thirty-first day after the final order. This court, therefore, is without jurisdiction to hear
appellant Brinkley’s appeal.”); see also Public Serv. Co. v. Wolf, 1967-NMSC-170, ¶ 15, 78 N.M. 221,
430 P.2d 379 (1967).
241. Lowe, 1990-NMSC-069, ¶ 1, 798 P.2d at 156.
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prerequisite,242 and held that the place of filing provision was likewise a
jurisdictional requirement because “the very concept of a timely filing (Rule 12-201)
includes the concept that the party has substantially complied with the applicable
place of filing requirements (Rule 12-202(A)).”243 He also ruled that “the mere
mailing of the notice to the [district court] judge as required by Rule244 did not
transform the jurisdictional defect of filing the notice of appeal in the wrong court
into a technical one”245 that might otherwise preclude dismissal because it did “not
affect the substantive rights of the parties.”246
Justice Montgomery dissented. He found the result reached by the Court
“unsound” and its reasoning “emptily formalistic.”247 Rejecting the notion that the
word “jurisdiction” has a fixed meaning that can be applied mechanically,248 Justice
Montgomery reprised his approach in Maples, insisting that the Court should instead
“focus on the purpose and policies of appeals and the rules governing them,” and
decide what is jurisdictional after considering whether those purposes would be
fostered or hindered by labeling a Rule requirement jurisdictional.249 To contrast the
majority’s holding and reasoning, he articulated the rationale for his dissent:
[J]urisdiction . . . is not something whose existence can be
determined by looking through a microscope; . . . jurisdiction is an
intensely practical concept used basically to tell lawyers and
judges, and the general public, when a court will entertain a case
and when it will not. The rules prescribing and delimiting
jurisdiction should therefore be construed and applied in similarly
practical ways—to accomplish the objective of defining those
instances when a court will decide a controversy and when,
presumably for good reasons, it will refuse to decide.250
Justice Montgomery conceded that the time requirement for filing a notice
of appeal serves the valid purpose of notifying the court and parties that the appeal
process has been invoked,251 but he found no commensurate significance to the
requirement that the notice of appeal be filed in the district court rather than in the
court of appeals, especially when, as in this case, notice of the filing was sent by mail

242. See id.
243. Id. ¶ 4, 798 P.2d at 157. In so ruling, Justice Ransom overruled a court of appeals opinion that
held that filing a timely notice of appeal in the wrong forum was not a jurisdictional defect but only a
technical violation of the applicable Rule. Id. ¶ 6, 798 P.2d at 157 (overruling Martinez v. Wooten
Construction Co, 1989-NMCA-074, 109 N.M. 16, 780 P.2d 1163).
244. He cited Rule 12-202(D)(3) NMRA. Id. ¶ 5, 798 P.2d at 157. The requirement is in current Rule
12-203(E)(3) NMRA.
245. Lowe, 1990-NMSC-069, ¶ 5, 798 P.2d at 157.
246. See Rule 12-312 (C) NMRA (“An appeal filed within the time limits provided in these rules shall
not be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202 which do not affect the substantive rights of the
parties.”).
247. Lowe, 1990-NMSC-069, ¶ 9, 798 P.2d at 157 (Montgomery, J. dissenting).
248. Id. ¶ 19, 798 P.2d at 160.
249. Id. ¶ 10, 798 P.2d at 158.
250. Id. ¶ 19, 798 P.2d at 160.
251. Id. ¶ 11, 798 P.2d at 158.
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to counsel for the appellee and to the district court.252 Because no prejudice resulted
from misfiling,253 no “abuse of the appellate process” occurred,254 and because the
court should attempt to foster the constitutional right to appeal,255 Justice
Montgomery concluded that the error was “a ‘technical violation’ of the rules . . . not
giving rise to a jurisdictional defect,”256 and the appeal should not have been
dismissed.257 Instead, he asserted the majority should have applied Rule 12-312(C),
which provides an appeal that is timely filed should not be dismissed for technical
Rule violations that do not affect the substantive rights of the parties.258
In Lowe, Justice Ransom decided that the Rule requirements for both the
time and place of filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional. By doing so, he relieved
the appellate court of the need for burdensome ad-hoc reviews of the record to see
if, on the facts of each case, the relevant policies supporting allowing the appeal
outweigh those that would bar the appeal. In contrast, Justice Montgomery eschewed
bright-line rules in both Maples and Lowe largely because they leave no room for
careful consideration of the purpose sought to be achieved by the legal doctrine being
applied in light of facts presented in each case.
Other justices might have been content to maintain and repeat their
respective positions in later cases, sometimes winning the votes of colleagues and
sometimes not. Justice Ransom and Justice Montgomery were different. Their
mutual respect and willingness to learn from one another prompted each to rethink
his view and often to modify a position after considering the views of the other. Their
continuing dialogue in subsequent cases dealing with the seemingly mundane issue
of the requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of New Mexico appellate courts
illustrates the benefits that flow from such a collegial approach to shaping New
Mexico law.
c.

Marquez v. Gomez (Is Attaching the Notice of Appeal Jurisdictional?)

In Marquez v. Gomez,259 a short opinion issued less than a month after
Lowe, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Court’s holding in Lowe. In
Lowe, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in the wrong court. In Marquez,
the appellants timely filed in the correct court but filed a docketing statement that
referenced the notice of appeal rather than attaching the notice of appeal as required
by Rule 12-202(A). The court of appeals concluded Lowe required dismissal of the
appeal, holding that “serving only their docketing statement on the district court
clerk” and not the notice of appeal was a jurisdictional defect.260
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel that included Justice
Montgomery, Justice Ransom ruled that this mistake did not constitute a
252. See id. ¶ 15, 798 P.2d at 159.
253. See id. ¶¶ 16–17, 798 P.2d at 159.
254. Id. ¶ 18, 798 P.2d at 159.
255. Id. ¶ 13, 798 P.2d at 158.
256. Id. ¶ 14, 798 P.2d at 158 (quoting Martinez v. Wooten Constr. Co., 1989-NMCA-074, ¶ 3, 109
N.M. 16, 708 P.2d 1163).
257. See id. ¶ 20, 798 P.2d at 160.
258. Id. ¶ 17, 798 P.2d at 159.
259. 1990-NMSC-101, 111 N.M. 14, 801 P.2d 84.
260. Id. ¶ 2, 801 P.2d at 84.
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jurisdictional defect but was only a technical error that should not result in dismissal
of the appeal.261 Identifying the error in Marquez as filing the wrong document rather
than filing late or in the wrong court, Justice Ransom distinguished Marquez from
Lowe.262 This allowed him in Marquez to embrace Justice Montgomery’s approach
in Lowe and in future cases not involving time or place deficiencies. Justice Ransom
determined the time and place requirements for filing were met, the docketing
statement “substantially complied” with the content requirements of Rule 12-202(B),
and no party claimed the error was prejudicial.263 Therefore, the error constituted
only a technical violation of the Rule that did not require dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction.264
In Marquez, Justice Ransom pivoted from requiring strict compliance with
requirements for invoking appellate jurisdiction to a policy-based, case-specific
analysis to determine whether requirements for perfecting an appeal are
jurisdictional. He did so by acknowledging the influence of Justice Montgomery’s
dissent in Lowe and endorsing that approach in future cases without abandoning his
opinion in Lowe that, like the time of filing requirement, the place of filing mandate
is a jurisdictional requirement. Justice Ransom acknowledged that for all other
requirements for perfecting an appeal, Justice Montgomery’s dissent in Lowe
“expressed the sentiments of this Court,” going forward as well as “our liberal
construction of rules in order that cases on appeal may be heard on their merits.”265
Marquez illustrates the process by which the two Justices listened to,
respected, and were influenced by the differing views each expressed. After
Marquez, a question remained, however: How much further might Justice Ransom
be willing to go in embracing Justice Montgomery’s preference for an ad-hoc policyoriented approach instead of clear, specific commands for perfecting appeals?
d.

Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez (Statutory Jurisdictional
Requirements vs. Housekeeping Procedural Statutes)

Less than two months after Marquez, the Court decided Lovelace Medical
Center v. Mendez,266 addressing a statutory provision with jurisdictional
implications. The issue involved a provision in a statute authorizing an interlocutory
appeal267 that stated if an application for interlocutory appeal was not accepted by

261. Id. ¶ 7, 801 P.2d at 85 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 1964-NMSC-233, 74. N.M. 567, 396 P.2d
181).
262. “Any objection to the insufficiency of the filing must go to its content and not, as was the case in
Lowe, to the place the notice was filed or delivered.” Id. ¶ 4, 801 P.2d at 84.
263. Id. ¶ 6, 801 P.2d at 85.
264. Id. ¶ 4, 801 P.2d at 84 (The Court applied Rule 12-312(C) in support of its conclusion: “[A]n
appeal within the time limits shall not be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202 which do not
affect the substantive rights of the parties.”).
265. Id. ¶ 3, 801 P.2d at 84.
266. 1991-NMSC-002, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603.
267. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (1999). The 1911 Constitution explicitly granted the legislature power
to provide for interlocutory appeals. N. M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1911). The current constitution does not
contain an equivalent provision. Instead, it more expansively provides that the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals “shall exercise jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 29.
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the court of appeals within twenty days after it is filed, the application was deemed
denied.268
The trial court granted a partial summary judgment for the defendant and
certified the order as appropriate for interlocutory appeal. The plaintiff filed a timely
petition asking the court of appeals to accept the appeal, and twenty-eight days later
the court of appeals accepted the petition for review. Over the objection of the
defendant, the court of appeals ruled that it had jurisdiction despite non-compliance
with the statute’s twenty-day requirement.
The issue presented in the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeals
had “jurisdiction . . . even though the application was granted more than twenty days
after it was filed,”269 contrary to the statute. The court of appeals had ruled that the
statute’s twenty-day limit for accepting the petition was a procedural provision that
was void, asserting that under the rule in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting,
Inc.,270 only the Supreme Court had power to regulate procedure in the courts.271
In an opinion by Justice Montgomery, concurred in by Justice Ransom,272
the Court affirmed that the court of appeals had jurisdiction but rejected the court of
appeals’ rationale that procedure is exclusively for the Court to determine.273 The
Court conceded that the twenty-day statutory limit might have qualified as a
legitimate statutory jurisdictional limitation, and if it did, “presumably we would
accord it that effect [because] the appellate jurisdiction of both this court and the
court of appeals is within the legislative power to prescribe.”274 But Justice
Montgomery identified two policy rationales calling for “construing it simply as a
housekeeping rule to assist the courts with the management of their cases.”275 First,
to do so would further the Court’s goal of facilitating decisions on the merits.276
Second, construing the time limit as a jurisdictional requirement might enmesh the
Court in an unnecessary separation-of-powers constitutional challenge to the statute
as interfering with the judiciary’s control of “the appellate process itself.”277
The Court concluded that the legislature did not intend the twenty-day
requirement to limit the court of appeals’ jurisdiction. It was only “intended to assist
the court with the management of their cases in the absence of some other
provision.”278 As a non-jurisdictional procedural statutory provision, the twenty-day

268. Lovelace Med. Ctr., 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 4, 805 P.2d at 605 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4
(Orig. Pamp.)).
269. Id. ¶ 1, 805 P.2d at 603.
270. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., 1976-NMSC-031, 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354.
271. Lovelace Med. Ctr., 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 5, 805 P.2d at 605.
272. Justice Ransom “fully concur[red]” in Justice Montgomery’s opinion addressing the
jurisdictional issue but wrote separately to express disagreement with one portion of the Court’s opinion
on the merits. Id. ¶ 46, 805 P.2d at 614 (Ransom, J., concurring).
273. Id. ¶ 10, 805 P.2d at 606 (“To resolve the jurisdictional issue in this case we need not go as far as
the above-quoted statement in Ammerman.”).
274. Id. ¶ 11, 805 P.2d at 606 (citing N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 29).
275. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 805 P.2d at 606–07.
276. Id. ¶ 12, 805 P.2d at 606–07 (citing Olguin v. State, 1977-NMSC-034, 90 N.M. 303, 563 P.2d
97; Jaritas Live Stock Co. v. Spriggs, 1937-NMSC-094, 42 N.M. 14, 74 P.2d 722).
277. Id.
278. Id. ¶ 13, 805 P.2d at 606.

Summer 2022 A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

467

limit was valid, but the Court could supersede it by adopting a contrary Rule.279 The
applicable Rule 12-303, however, did not contain a contrary time limit; it was silent
on the matter.280 The Montgomery opinion for the Court noted the absence of an
equivalent Rule provision might itself be considered contrary to the statutory time
limit and thus would have superseded the statute’s time limit.281 But if the absence
of a time limit in the Rule was not contrary to the statute’s twenty-day requirement,
“the statutory provision remains in effect as a rule of court but it may be waived or
relaxed by the court . . . in the absence of abuse of discretion or prejudice to a
party.”282 Finding no undue prejudice to the appellee,283 the Supreme Court affirmed
that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.284
Lovelace also marks another significant step in the gradual process by
which Justice Ransom moved away from his preference in Lowe for specific
jurisdictional requirements not subject to ad-hoc policy-based exceptions. By
concurring in Justice Montgomery’s opinion, he embraced the view that arguably
jurisdictional statutes limiting appellate courts might often better be construed as
only housekeeping procedures for perfecting an appeal; that the choice between a
jurisdictional limitation and a housekeeping rule is seldom fixed; more often, it is
determined by policy considerations that favor promoting the constitution’s
guarantee of a right to appeal and its concomitant preference that appeals be decided
on the merits.
Justice Montgomery also signaled a desire to move even further away from
rigid jurisdictional requirements. Though appellate jurisdiction “is within the
legislative power to prescribe,”285 he wrote that if the legislature intended a statute
to have jurisdictional effect, “presumably” the Court would give it that effect “unless
we were to hold it unconstitutional under Ammerman.”286 Ammerman might support
rejecting the validity of a jurisdictional statute, he noted, if the statute would “intrude
directly” into the doctrine of separation of powers.287 Justice Montgomery thus
provided a rationale for further limitations on legislative power to control appellate
jurisdiction by subjecting “jurisdictional” statutes to constitutional scrutiny to
determine if they violated separation of powers.

279. See id. ¶¶ 14–15, 805 P.2d at 607–08.
280. Id. ¶ 16, 805 P.2d at 608.
281. See id.
282. Id. ¶ 16, 805 P.2d at 606. Justice Montgomery conceded that the power to “relax” a procedural
provision “applies mainly to . . . relaxation of its own rule, not a rule of a higher authority,” but he
expanded its application to a statue here as one “in which a directive has been adopted in large part for
the benefit of the court which seeks to relax it.” Id. ¶ 18, 805 P.2d at 608.
283. Id. ¶ 19, 805 P.2d at 608.
284. Id. ¶ 20, 805 P.2d at 608.
285. Id. ¶ 11, 805 P.2d at 606.
286. Id.
287. Id. ¶ 12, 805 P.2d at 606. The New Mexico Constitution explicitly provides for the separation of
powers among the three branches of government, N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1.

468

e.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

Govich v. North American Systems, Inc. (Substantial Compliance with
Procedural Rules)

In Govich v. North American Systems Inc.,288 decided six months after
Lovelace, Justice Ransom wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel that did not
include Justice Montgomery. In Govich, Justice Ransom continued to reassess his
expansive view of jurisdictional limits in Lowe that he began in Marquez.289 The
Goviches filed an action seeking damages for both personal injuries and lost wages,
and their subrogated insurer joined as a co-plaintiff seeking recovery for property
damage.290 The trial court granted a partial summary judgment dismissing the
personal injury claims. The Goviches filed a timely notice of appeal, to no avail
because the partial summary judgment was not a final judgment and thus could not
then be appealed.291
The trial court later entered a second order denying Defendants’ discovery
requests. That order also stated that all of Plaintiffs’ claims had been dismissed by
the first order and dismissed the Goviches from the lawsuit.292 Plaintiffs filed a timely
notice of appeal from this second ruling and only attached the second order denying
discovery.293 Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ failure to attach the first order
dismissing their personal injury claims, as required by Rule 12-202(C),294 “fails to
confer jurisdiction over the partial summary judgment order.”295 Justice Ransom
disagreed and held the appeal was properly before the Court.296
Justice Ransom did not simply apply his holding in Marquez v. Gomez that
failure to attach the proper documents to a timely notice of appeal is not a
jurisdictional defect and can be forgiven if the filed documents “substantially
complied” with the Rule and the appellee was not prejudiced.297 Rather, Justice
Ransom explored the underlying rationales in Marquez and in Justice Montgomery’s
dissent in Lowe v. Bloom298 to revisit, review, and significantly modify his own
opinion in Lowe.
He acknowledged his statement in Lowe that “appellate rules for the time
and place of filing a notice of appeal govern the proper invocation of our
288. 1991-NMSC-061, 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94.
289. See Marquez v. Gomez, 1990-NMSC-101, ¶ 3, 111 N.M. 14, 801 P.2d 84.
290. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 4, 814 P.2d at 96.
291. Id. ¶ 10, 814 P.2d at 97 (“[T]he partial summary judgment order left unresolved the Goviches’
property claims and, thus . . . cannot be a final order from which appeal properly may be taken.”); see
Rule 1-054(C)(1) NMRA. Rule 1-054 was amended in 2016 and the relevant provision is now in Rule 1054(B) NMRA.
292. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 8, 814 P.2d at 96.
293. Id.
294. “A copy of the judgment or order appealed from . . . shall be attached to the notice of appeal.”
Rule 12-202(B) NMRA (1986).
295. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 11, 814 P.2d at 97–98.
296. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 814 P.2d at 98 (“The policies in this state, and the purpose of [Rule 12-312(C)], are
vindicated if the intent to appeal a specific judgment fairly can be inferred from the notice of appeal and
if the appellee is not prejudiced by any mistake . . . . Under these circumstances we will treat the Goviches’
second notice of appeal as the functional equivalent of an appeal from the partial summary judgment order
and the order of dismissal.”).
297. Marquez v. Gomez, 1990-NMSC-101, ¶¶ 6–7, 111 N.M. 14, 801 P.2d 84.
298. 1990-NMSC-069, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156.
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jurisdiction.”299 But crediting Justice Montgomery with having “explored this
concept eloquently in his dissent to Lowe,”300 Justice Ransom stressed that in
Marquez the Court expressed a strong policy preference for facilitating the
constitutional right to appeal, a policy that is served by “liberally construing technical
deficiencies in a notice of appeal otherwise satisfying the time and place of filing
requirements.”301 That policy-based approach, developed by Justice Montgomery,
provided Justice Ransom a rationale for moving away from his holding in Lowe that
compliance with time and place requirements for perfecting an appeal are bright-line
jurisdictional requirements.302
The semantic vehicle for his retreat from Lowe was the adoption of a new
terminology. He discarded the term “jurisdictional” for describing the Court’s Rules
for perfecting appeals, ruling that “we properly should refer hereafter to the
mandatory sections of our rules of appellate practice as ‘mandatory’”
preconditions.303 However, the transformation was not merely cosmetic. It signaled
that Rules that had been treated as jurisdictional imperatives were now subject to the
Court’s exercise of discretion to excuse non-compliance:
Though we have stated in categorical terms that we cannot
entertain an appeal when the notice does not satisfy the
requirements for time and place of filing, what we in essence have
held is simply that, with respect to the mandates for time and place
of filing the notice of appeal, we decline to exercise discretion to
excuse or justify any improper attempt to invoke our jurisdiction.
It is probably imprecise to say we cannot exercise such
discretion.304
Justice Ransom listed the factors an appellate court should consider when
deciding whether to excuse non-compliance with mandatory preconditions:
[U]nder Rule 12–312(C) an appeal timely filed is not to be
dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12–202 that do not
affect the substantive rights of the parties. The policies in this state,
and the purpose of the rule, are vindicated if the intent to appeal a
specific judgment fairly can be inferred from the notice of appeal
and if the appellee is not prejudiced by any mistake.305
Finding “the Goviches’ intent to appeal the [first] order can be inferred from their
submissions,” and because no defendant claimed being misled by the failure to attach
the first order, the Court ruled that the appeal would proceed.306

299. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 814 P.2d at 98.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Lowe, 1990-NMSC- 069, ¶¶ 3–4, 798 P.2d at 157.
303. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 814 P.2d at 98. The court adopted the phrase from Mann v.
Lynaugh, 840 F.2d 1194, 1197 (5th Cir. 1988).
304. Govich, 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 814 P.2d at 98.
305. Id. ¶ 13, 814 P.2d at 98.
306. Id. ¶ 14, 814 P.2d at 98.
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Thus, Justice Ransom retreated from his ruling in Lowe that filing in the
proper court is a jurisdictional requirement and affirmed his ruling in Mendez that
failure to attach required documents to the notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional
requirement; rather they are mandatory prerequisites subject to the Court’s
discretionary power to excuse non-compliance for sound reasons. The opinion is
ambiguous, however, about whether the timely filing of the notice of appeal likewise
was converted from a jurisdictional requirement to a mandatory precondition. Justice
Ransom’s opinion seems to confirm timely filing is still a jurisdictional
requirement,307 while also alternatively suggesting that it is now a mandatory
prerequisite subject to discretionary exemptions from strict compliance.308
An argument can be advanced that the time requirement for filing is a
jurisdictional requirement because although Rule 12-201 contains a thirty-day timeof-filing requirement,309 its roots are in the constitution. The 1965 amendments
provide that both the Supreme Court310 and the court of appeals311 “shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction as ‘provided by law,’” which means provided by the enactment
of statutes.312 And in multiple statutes, the Legislature has enshrined the requirement
that appeals be brought within thirty days of the final judgment or order appealed
from.313
Nonetheless, Supreme Court Rule 12-202(A) provides that in appeals of
right from the district court, the notice of appeal shall be filed “within the time
allowed by Rule 12-201,” rather than the time allowed by statute.314 Rule 12-201
provides for extensions of the thirty-day Rule requirement315 for filing that are not
found in the statutes setting the jurisdiction of the appellate courts.
In sum, Govich transformed almost all Rule requirements for perfecting an
appeal to mere preconditions that can be modified by Rule or excused by the court.
Left unresolved was whether the time requirement for filing an appeal is a
307. “[A]n appeal timely filed is not to be dismissed for technical violations of Rule 12-202. . . . ” Id.
¶ 13, 814 P.2d at 99 (emphasis added). Moreover, Rule 12-312(C) NMRA excludes untimely appeals
from the grant of permission to excuse non-compliance with technical violations.
308. “[W]hat we in essence have held is simply that, with respect to the mandates for time and place
of filing the notice of appeal, we decline to exercise discretion to excuse or justify any improper attempt
to invoke our jurisdiction. It is probably imprecise to say we cannot exercise such discretion.” Govich,
1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 814 P.2d at 99 (emphasis added).
309. Rule 12-201(A)(1)(b) NMRA.
310. N.M. CONST., art.VI, § 2.
311. N.M. CONST., art. VI, § 29.
312. E.g., State ex rel. N.M. Judicial Standards Comm’n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 28, 134
N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197 (construing the phrase “provided by law” to mean “that law that must come from
the Constitution or legislation.”); State v. Griffin, 1994-NMSC-061, ¶ 3, n.2, 117 N.M. 745, 877 P.2d 551
(“Provided by law’ generally means ‘provided by statutes.’”).
313. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (2021) (civil appeals from district court); § 39-3-3(A)(1) (appeals
from district court in criminal cases); § 39-3-7 (appeals from district court; special statutory proceedings);
§ 39-3-15 (appeals: contempt and habeas corpus); § 39-3-1.1(C) (appeal of final decisions by agencies to
district court ); § 34-5-14(B) (supreme court; review by certiorari to court of appeals) (20 days); see also
§ 39-3-4(B) (interlocutory order appeals from district court “fifteen days after entry of the order or
decision”).
314. Rule 12-202(A) NMRA.
315. Rule 12-201(E) NMRA (motions for extension of time). The Rule also allows additional time
when notice is sent by mail or commercial carrier. Rule 12-201(F) NMRA.
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jurisdictional requirement rooted in the constitution’s delegation to the Legislature
to provide by statute for the appellate jurisdiction or has been transformed by Rule
12-202(A) into a Court Rule that appellate courts can amend, expand, or dispense
with for sound reasons.
f.

Kelly Inn No. 102 v. Kapnison (The Final Judgment Requirement)

One subject has survived the Court’s transformation of previous
jurisdictional requirements into mandatory provisions subject to the Court’s rulemaking power and power to excuse non-compliance. Except for interlocutory
appeals authorized by statute316 and extraordinary writs,317 a final judgment is a
prerequisite for appellate court review.318 In the absence of a generally-applicable
statutory definition of a final judgment,319 the Supreme Court in earlier cases
provided a general test to determine whether a judgment is final—whether “all issues
of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to
the fullest extent possible.” 320 However, numerous Supreme Court cases construed
judgments as final that did not meet the standard definition. The exceptions largely
dealt with cases where the merits were resolved but the district court must take
further actions to carry out the decree.321
In Kelly Inn No 102, Inc. v. Kapnison,322 the Court sought to “clarify the
confusing state of the law surrounding the finality of judgments,”323 which “raises
an issue of our jurisdiction to consider the . . . appeal.”324 Kelly Inn involved a
contractual dispute arising over the terms of a lease that provided for attorney’s fees
316. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-3-2; 39-3-3 (a)(2); 39-3-4; 39-3-7 (1966).
317. NM Const. art VI, § 3; see id. art. VI § 29; N.M. STAT. ANN § 39-3-5 (1966); Rules 12-501–505
NMRA.
318. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 10, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033
(Whether a judgment is final, “raises an issue of our jurisdiction to consider the . . . appeal.”); see also
Pacheco v. Pacheco, 1971-NMSC-049, ¶ 3, 82 N.M. 486, 484 P.2d 328; Quintana v. Quintana, 1971NMSC-070, ¶ 5, 82 N.M. 698, 487 P.2d 126; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Miles, 1969-NMSC-056, ¶ 6, 80
N.M. 237, 453 P.2d 757.
An explicit final judgment requirement in the 1911 constitution, N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1911)
was retained in the 1965 constitution only for appeals from decisions of probate courts and other inferior
courts. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 27. Statutes authorizing appeals in various contexts continue to provide
that, with the exceptions mentioned, only final judgments may be appealed. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 393-2 (1966) (“any final judgment or decision”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3(A)(1) (1972) (“final
judgment”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-7 (1978) (“final judgments” or “final orders after entry judgment”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-15 (1966) (“thirty days from the judgment of conviction); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
39-3-1.1 (1999) (“agency final decisions”).
319. The legislature has defined “final decision” for purpose of review of administrative rulings to the
district court, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-1.1 (H)(2) (1999), but then provides that the meaning of the phrase
“shall be governed by the law regarding the finality of decisions by district courts.” N.M. STAT. ANN. §
39-3-1.1 (G)(2) (1999).
320. B.L. Goldberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Uptown, Inc., 1985-NMSC-084, ¶ 3, 103 N.M. 277, 705 P.2d
683. The definition is “essentially the same as that set out in Sacramento Valley Irrigation Co. v. Lee,
1910-NMSC-049, 15 N.M. 567, 113 P. 834.” Kelly Inn, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 14, 824 P.2d at 1038.
321. See the list of cases found in Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 16–19,
113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033.
322. Id.
323. Id. ¶ 1, 824 P.2d at 1035.
324. Id.
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for the winning party. The trial court ruled for the lessors and entered judgment,
stating it would later hold a hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees.325
Before the hearing took place, the lessee filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
The trial court ruled that once the notice of appeal was filed, the district court lost
jurisdiction to determine attorney’s fees. The lessors appealed.326 The “specific
issue” presented was whether the judgment was final though attorney’s fees had not
yet been assessed.327
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel that did not include Justice
Ransom, Justice Montgomery conceded that “[t]o distill . . . a general principle that
will provide an easy answer to the question when a judgment is final and when it is
not is probably a hopeless undertaking,” particularly in what he labelled “the twilight
zone of finality.”328 Despite his pessimism, Justice Montgomery balanced
“competing” interests with respect to efficiency329 and adopted a specific definition
of finality for cases in which the merits were resolved but issues such as attorney’s
fees remained:
Where a judgment declares the rights and liabilities of the parties
to the underlying controversy, a question remaining to be decided
thereafter will not prevent the judgment from being final if
resolution of that question will not alter the judgment or moot or
revise decisions embodied therein.330
Justice Montgomery’s approach in Kelly Inn contrasts with the ad-hoc
approach he employed in his Maples dissent to determine if a statutory or Rule
provision was a jurisdictional limitation on appellate jurisdiction or a modifiable
housekeeping rule.331 In Kelly Inn, he identified a recurring factual pattern—further

325. Id. ¶ 3, 824 P.2d at 1035.
326. Id. ¶ 1, 824 P.2d at 1035.
327. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 10, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033.
328. Id. ¶20, 824 P.2d at 1040. That phrase is often used to denote finality questions which are
“frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful
arguments,” and where “it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases.” Cent.Southwest Dairy Coop. v. Am. Bank of Com., 1967-NMSC-231, ¶ 17, 78 N.M. 464, 432 P.2d 820
(internal citation omitted).
329. Justice Montgomery noted the inefficiency that would result if the trial court’s post-appeal rulings
were to undermine the judgment on appeal and thus require dismissal of the first appeal, the entry of a
new judgment by the district court and a new of appeal Kelly Inn, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 27, 824 P.2d at
1042 (citing with approval Banquest/First Nat. Bank of Santa Fe v. LMT, Inc., 1987-NMSC-021, ¶ 9, 105
N.M. 583, 734 P.2d 1266, in which the Court disapproved of accepting appeals where the Court “may be
required to consider the same issues a second time.”). But he also acknowledged an efficient, earlier
resolution of the main appeal would result if the judgment on appeal were deemed final and could proceed
promptly, thus facilitating the constitutional right to an appeal. Kelly Inn, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 27–28,
824 P.2d at 1042.
330. Id. ¶ 21, 824 P.2d at 1040.
331. In Maples, Justice Montgomery also identified and explored the competing policy rationales for
choosing between the two alternatives, but he did not provide a specific, general test for resolving the
question in different settings. Instead, he proposed an answer dependent on the unique facts presented in
each appealed case. He implied that courts would have to reach an ad-hoc answer by applying the
competing policies identified in Maples to the specific statutes, Rules and factual setting presented in each
case. See Maples v. State, 1990-NMSC-042, ¶ 25, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788.
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proceedings in district court after a notice of appeal is filed. He then identified and
weighed the relevant policies involved to help decide whether to create a specific
definition of a final judgment in that category of cases. In doing so, Justice
Montgomery noted that because the definition of finality has jurisdictional
consequences, “a bright-line rule regarding the finality of a decision on the merits
. . . is preferable to a case-by-case approach” in resolving the matter.332 He thus
melded aspects of his preference for policy-based rulings with Justice Ransom’s
advocacy in Lowe for specific, generally applicable rulings that provide needed
certainty in determining whether jurisdictional requirements are met.
Justice Montgomery acknowledged that other cases would present different
factual settings within the “twilight zone” to which the new rule in Kelly Inn would
not apply.333 Nonetheless, by attempting to synthesize existing case law and then
formulating a general rule for defining a final judgment in the specific context
presented in Kelly Inn, he moved a step closer to Justice Ransom’s preference for
clear rules governing access to the appellate courts that would obviate case by case
policy-driven considerations to determine whether a requirement for appeal is met.
g.

State v. Orosco (Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Error Doctrine)

In State v. Orosco,334 defendants were convicted of the same criminal
conduct in separate trials. After they appealed and briefing was complete in the court
of appeals, the Supreme Court decided a different case holding that “unlawfulness”
is an essential element of the crime.335 Defendants then sought a reversal of their
convictions, arguing failure to instruct their juries on an essential element of a crime
constituted a “jurisdictional error” that can be raised for the first time on appeal and
compelled reversal of their convictions.336 Justice Montgomery wrote the Court’s
opinion that affirmed the convictions. Justice Ransom wrote a concurring opinion
that sharply diverged from Justice Montgomery’s reasoning.
The procedural issue concerned an appellate Rule containing exceptions to
the general rule that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.337 One exception provides that challenges to subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal;338 another provides that the
appellate court has discretion to review unpreserved allegations of error that qualify
as a “fundamental error.”339
332. Kelly Inn, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 13, 824 P.2d at 1037.
333. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 20, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033.
Indeed, even the specific definition of a final judgment Justice Montgomery crafted could not later avoid
slipping back into the “twilight zone” of finality. See Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe, 1993-NMSC-017,
115 N.M. 397, 851 P.2d 1064, infra at text accompanying notes 382–90.
334. 1992-NMSC-006, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146.
335. State v. Osborne, 1991-NMSC-032, 111 N.M. 654, 808 P.2d 624.
336. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 5, 833 P.2d at 1148. The court of appeals certified the appeal to the
Supreme Court pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(C) (1972) to resolve the issues. Id. ¶ 1, 833 P.2d
at 1147. That statute allows the court of appeals to certify to the Supreme Court a case for review
undecided by the court under certain circumstances.
337. Id. ¶ 7, n.4 , 833 P.2d at 1149 (Rule 12-216(B) NMRA). The Rule has since been amended and
recompiled as Rule 12-321 NMRA.
338. Id. ¶ 7, n.4, 833 P.2d at 1149.
339. Id.
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The defendants first argued that the court of appeals’ precedents established
the failure to instruct on a necessary element of the crime constituted jurisdictional
error compelling reversal of their convictions.340 Not unexpectedly, Justice
Montgomery objected to framing the matter in terms of “jurisdiction.” He ruled that
“‘jurisdictional error’ must be confined to instances in which the court was not
competent to act,” and overruled contrary precedents.341 Here, the trial courts had
subject matter jurisdiction of the criminal cases and thus were competent to rule on
the failure to give a necessary instruction.342
Having confirmed his view of the narrow scope of “jurisdictional errors,”
Justice Montgomery addressed the Rule provision allowing an appellate court to
review an unpreserved “fundamental error.”343 Unlike jurisdictional limits, the
Rule’s fundamental error exception expressly grants an appellate court discretion
whether to address an unpreserved error.344 This fits comfortably within Justice
Montgomery’s preference for ad-hoc policy-based analysis to determine that an
appeal may proceed although appellate Rules are not complied with.
Consistent with prior cases, 345 Justice Montgomery determined that “[t]he
rule of fundamental error applies only if there has been a miscarriage of justice, if
the question of guilt is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the
conviction to stand, or if substantial justice has not been done.”346
In sum, even errors of “constitutional dimension” will only be reversed as
fundamental error “when the interests of justice require,” or the court has exceeded
the scope of its powers.347 The focus on whether the otherwise fundamental error
constituted a miscarriage of justice justifies the court “in examining the facts in each
case to determine whether the error in the instructions rose to the level of
fundamental error so as to justify reversal.”348 To do otherwise, Justice Montgomery
insisted, “would be a perversion of justice, a classic demonstration of profoundly
inequitable results that follow when the judiciary worships form and ignores
substance.”349

340. State v, Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 6–7, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146 (citing State v. Walsh,
1969-NMCA-123, 463 P.2d 41; State v. Southerland, 1983-NMCA-131, 673 P.2d 1324).
341. Id. In an earlier case dealing with a similar issue, Justice Montgomery ruled that “the jurisdiction
of a district court does not depend on how the court decides a contested issue submitted to it; the test ‘is
whether or not it had power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion * * * was right or
wrong.’” Sundance Mech. & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 1990-NMSC-031, ¶ 15, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250
(internal citation omitted).
342. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 833 P.2d at 1149.
343. Id. ¶ 7, n.4, 833 P.2d at 1149 (citing SCRA 1986, 21-216(B)). The Rule has since been amended
and recompiled as Rule 12-321 NMRA.
344. Rule 12-321(B)(2) NMRA.
345. The Supreme Court had previously held that the fundamental error doctrine does not always
compel the appellate court to reverse for failure to instruct on a necessary element of the crime charged.
See Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 833 P.2d at 1150–51 (citing State v. Ortega, 1991-NMSC-084, 112
N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196).
346. State v, Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146.
347. Id. ¶ 17, 833 P.2d at 1151–52.
348. Id.
349. Id. ¶ 13, 833 P.2d at 1151 (quoting State v. Bell, 1977-NMSC-013, ¶ 62, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d
925).

Summer 2022 A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

475

After reviewing the trial proceedings, Justice Montgomery determined that
“under the undisputed evidence of unlawfulness . . . upon which the juries relied to
find that defendants committed the acts, the juries themselves effectively determined
the existence of the omitted element.”350 He concluded, therefore, that the failure to
instruct on the element did not prejudice the defendants and so was not fundamental
error351 and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.
Justice Ransom wrote a concurring opinion. He agreed that the convictions
should be affirmed but took issue with Justice Montgomery’s reasoning. He asserted
that whether labelled “jurisdictional” or some other term, there are bright-line legal
doctrines that deprive a court of the power to proceed even when subject matter and
personal jurisdiction exist.352 He therefore disapproved of Justice Montgomery’s
tendency to allow “bright-line principles” to give way uniformly “to case-by-case
analysis based upon principles of justice and conscience,”353 preferring instead the
retention of a “mechanistic approach” that previously had been applied by New
Mexico courts, though not one that “worships form and ignores substance.”354
Their movement toward consensus seemingly ended with Orosco. But even
in the face of their apparently irreconcilable views,355 Justice Ransom found a path
permitting him to concur in Justice Montgomery’s affirmance of the convictions.
While he disagreed with Justice Montgomery’s broad statement that in every case
the fundamental error doctrine applies “only if . . . substantial justice has not been
done,”356 Justice Ransom had no objection to the creation of an exception to the rule
that fundamental error requires reversal if the exception is cabined within clear
parameters. He construed Justice Montgomery’s opinion as providing a limited,
specific exception to the fundamental error doctrine—a “necessarily established”
exception, in which he acquiesced.357 Even when the Justices disagreed on core
principles, they creatively worked to achieve consensus of results consistent with
their different views.358
h.

Carrillo v. Rostro (Collateral Order Appeals and the Writ of Error)

Carrillo v. Rostro,359 addressed a proposal to adopt the collateral order
doctrine, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in federal civil rights cases that are
subject to the defense of “qualified immunity.” The federal doctrine serves to protect
government officials performing official functions not only from liability but also

350. Id. ¶ 19, 833 P.2d at 1152.
351. Id. ¶ 20, 833 P.2d at 1152.
352. Id. ¶ 35, 833 P.2d at 1154 (Ransom, J. concurring). Justice Ransom first expressed this view in a
special concurrence to Sundance Mechanical & Utility Co. v. Atlas, where he stated, “I would not abandon
so quickly the principle that the Court lacks power to grant relief on a complaint that fails to state a cause
of action, and that ‘power or authority’ is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised for the first time on
appeal.” 1990-NMSC-031, ¶ 37, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250.
353. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 36, 833 P.2d at 1154 (Ransom, J., concurring).
354. Id.
355. Id. ¶ 35, 833 P.2d at 1154.
356. Id. ¶ 12, 833 P.2d at 1150 (majority opinion).
357. Id. ¶ 37, 833 P.2d at 1155 (Ransom, J., concurring).
358. See e.g., Lowe v. Bloom, 1990-NMSC-069, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156.
359. 1992-NMSC-054, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130.
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from having to engage in extensive litigation.360 To assure that defendants
erroneously denied the protection of the immunity have early access to appellate
courts, the U.S. Supreme Court created the “collateral order doctrine”361 to permit
immediate appeal of many summary judgments denying the defense of qualified
immunity.362 The Supreme Court has described the purpose of the collateral order
doctrine and identified three requirements that must be met:
The collateral order doctrine [applied in federal court] is a “narrow
exception,” whose reach is limited to trial court orders affecting
rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate
appeal. To fall within the exception, an order must at a minimum
satisfy three conditions: It must “conclusively determine the
disputed question,” “resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action,” and “be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”363
In Carrillo, the state district court had denied defendants’ motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 civil rights action.
Following the court of appeals’ denial of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to New
Mexico Statutes Annotated Section 39-3-4,364 Defendants filed a notice of appeal,
asserting that the federal collateral order doctrine authorizing immediate appeal must
be applied in Section 1983 lawsuits brought in state court.
In an opinion written by Justice Montgomery, the Supreme Court rejected
that claim, with separate concurring opinions by Justice Ransom and Justice Baca.
The Court decided that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution did
not compel the State to apply the federal collateral order doctrine in Section 1983
lawsuits brought in state court.365
The Court, however, created a collateral order doctrine that differs in a
significant manner from the federal doctrine. The federal collateral order doctrine is
not an exception to the statutory requirement that authorizes appeals from “final
decisions” of the district courts. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court determined it is an
alternative definition of a final decision: “[D]enial of a claim of qualified immunity,
to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within

360. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
361. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
362. See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 525–27.
363. Richardson–Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
364. The statute authorizes appeal of an interlocutory order “which does not practically dispose of the
merits of the action [when the judge] believes the order or decision involves a controlling question of law
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order or decision may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” N.M. STAT. ANN. §
39-3-4(A) (1999).
365. Carrillo v. Rostro, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 30 n.10, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (“We do not rest
our holding in this case—that the trial court’s denial of qualified immunity is reviewable—on the
Supremacy Clause.”). In 1997, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the Supremacy Clause
does not compel states to adopt the collateral order doctrine: “While some States have adopted a similar
‘collateral order’ exception when construing their jurisdictional statutes, we have never suggested that
federal law compelled them to do so.” Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 917 (1997).
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the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final
judgment.”366
Had the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled similarly to the U.S. Supreme
Court that the collateral order doctrine resulted in a “final decision,”367 the number
of appeals of right potentially would have increased exponentially, a result the Court
sought to avoid. As the Court noted, “if applied in too many contexts, the doctrine
will allow interruption of trial court proceedings by any party claiming hardship
because of postponement of review—a result that the final-judgment rule seeks to
prevent.”368 The federal “final decision” version would enmesh the court in continual
“piecemeal appeals . . . despite this Court’s . . . strong policy against them.”369
Instead, Justice Montgomery’s opinion transformed the collateral order
doctrine from one creating a right to appeal to one that allows the appellate court
discretion to determine whether to accept a request for appellate review.370 Unable
to fit the collateral order doctrine into the existing statute authorizing interlocutory
appeals,371 and concluding it would be an inappropriate use of its power of
superintending control of the lower courts to impose the doctrine,372 Justice
Montgomery transformed the moribund writ of error373 into the vehicle for
incorporating the collateral order doctrine into the fabric of New Mexico appellate
jurisdiction.374
Justice Montgomery identified two specific benefits of this new use of the
writ of error. First, an aggrieved party must file a petition seeking issuance of the
writ and no disruption of the trial court’s proceedings will occur unless the district
court issues a stay of proceedings pending the Court’s decision whether to grant the

366. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530.
367. In New Mexico, appeals of right in civil cases are authorized from “the entry of any final
judgment or decision.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-2 (1966) (emphasis added).
368. Carrillo, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 23, 845 P.2d at 139.
369. Id.
370. Id. ¶ 28, 845 P.2d at 140.
371. N.M. STAT. ANN. Section 39-3-2 applies only to interlocutory orders or decisions “which
practically dispose of the merits,” while the collateral order doctrine requires the order must resolve an
issue “completely separate from the merits of the action.” Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 430–31(1985). Moreover, it is the Legislature that has authority to authorize interlocutory appeals.
See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29 (court of
appeals appellate jurisdiction).
372. Though the writ of superintending control, see N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3, might occasionally
encompass an appeal that meets the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, the Court concluded that
its primary use – to prevent an “erroneous, arbitrary and tyrannical order” by a lower court, made it an
unsuitable vehicle for incorporating the doctrine into New Mexico law. Carrillo, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 31,
845 P.2d at 141.
373. The writ of error at one time was the procedural device for appellate review of proceedings at
law, and appeal was the means for reviewing equity decisions. Carrillo, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 31, 845 P.2d
at 146. When law and equity merged, appeal became the means for review of all cases. Id. The Court
explained in detail the history of the writ of error and the reasons for its virtual demise. Id. ¶¶ 31–56, 845
P.2d at 146–47. The Clerk of the Court reported that often, only one writ of error was filed annually
“usually by an inmate seeking to exhaust every conceivable avenue of relief.” Id. ¶ 29, 845 P.2d at 141.
374. See id. ¶ 25, 845 P.2d at 139. Because for a writ of error to issue the remedy by appeal must be
inadequate, Justice Montgomery determined the writ “provides the touchstone for our adaptation of the
writ of error as the procedural device for invoking the collateral order doctrine.” Id. ¶ 27, 845 P.2d at 140.
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writ.375 Second, by rejecting the federal doctrine that the collateral order doctrine is
a broadened definition of a “final decision” with a right to appeal, the Court can
maintain control of its docket because “the aggrieved party will have to apply to this
Court for a writ of error, which will be issued or not in our discretion.”376
Justice Montgomery’s decision to eschew treating the collateral order
doctrine as a definition of a final judgment and his decision to treat it as a form of
interlocutory appeal was consistent with his oft-repeated preference for shaping
appellate jurisdiction requirements in light of policy goals and consideration of the
facts of each case.377 His decision to grant the Court unfettered discretion whether to
accept appeals even where the requirements are arguably met is another example of
his quest to limit bright-line rules.
It is surprising that Justice Ransom’s special concurring opinion approved
of Justice Montgomery’s adoption of the writ of error and the use of the writ of error
given his preference for bright-line rules involving arguable jurisdictional
requirements.378 Justice Baca’s special concurrence may have allayed Justice
Ransom’s usual concern that broad discretionary standards for appellate review not
replace specific requirements determining appellate jurisdiction. Justice Baca
cabined the use of the writ of error as a means of interlocutory appeal. He extolled
the values served by the final judgment rule379 and wrote separately “to emphasize
the extremely limited reach of the collateral order doctrine . . . in the hope of
stemming the tide of appeals that I anticipate will flood this court in the wake of
today’s opinion.”380
375. Id. ¶ 28, 845 P.2d at 140.
376. Id. There is a third benefit not explicitly addressed by the Court in the use of the writ of error to
house the collateral order doctrine. By packaging the collateral order doctrine into the existing but seldomused writ of error that the New Mexico Constitution explicitly provides for in Article 6, Section 3, Justice
Montgomery functionally created a new form of interlocutory appeal without violating the constitutional
provisions implicitly granting only the legislature the power to do so. See N.M. CONST. art. VI §§ 2, 29.
The use of the writ of error also raised an issue that Justice Montgomery failed to foresee. Carrillo
anticipated that only the Supreme Court would issue writs of error. 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 28, 845 P.2d at
140. In 1993, however, while Justice Montgomery was still on the bench, the Court amended Rule 12-503
to provide that the court of appeals could also issue writs of error, despite the fact that the constitution
apparently authorized the Court to do so. See NMRA Rule 12-503(A); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 29. Justice
Montgomery later concluded that the Supreme Court lacked power to grant the court of appeals authority
to issue the writ. See Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery, Jurisdiction as May be Provided
by Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36 N.M.L. REV. 215, 247–49 (2006).
Nonetheless, Rule 12-503(A) remains unchanged, and the court of appeals now issues writs of error.
377. See e.g., Lowe v. Bloom, 1990-NMSC-069, ¶¶ 9–20, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156 (Montgomery,
J., dissenting).
378. Carrillo, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 52, 845 P.2d at 147; see State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 36,
113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146 (Ransom, J., concurring).
379. Carrillo, 1992-NMSC-054, ¶ 57, 845 P.2d at 148–49 (Baca, J., concurring).
380. Id. ¶ 56, 845 P.2d at 148. Justice Baca’s concurring opinion presaged the further development of
this area of the law. See id. ¶¶ 56–62, 845 P.2d at 148–50. In 2004, the Supreme Court took Justice Baca’s
concern to heart, severely limiting the use of the writ of error to review interlocutory orders. King v.
Allstate Ins., 2004-NMCA-031, 135 N.M. 206, 86 P.3d 631. Emphasizing the limited scope of the
collateral order doctrine, the Court noted its use in New Mexico had been confined to only two types of
orders—denials of qualified immunity in federal Section 1983 litigation and denials of a sovereign
immunity defense in certain lawsuits against the State. Id. ¶ 16, 86 P.3d at 634. The Court declared a
blanket prohibition on use of the collateral order doctrine to review discovery orders compelling discover
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Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe (Ransom and Montgomery Coming
Together)

In Orosco v. State, Justice Ransom had reaffirmed his prior conviction that
bright-line jurisdictional limitations should not give way to the case-by-case policybased flexible determinations Justice Montgomery espoused.381 Given his view in
Orosco, it would seem unlikely that the two Justices would find common ground
when resolving disputes about the limits of appellate court jurisdiction. Ironically, in
Trujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe,382 Justice Ransom carved out a policy-based exception
from Justice Montgomery’s bright-line rule in Kelly Inn that a judgment is final when
the merits are resolved even though the trial court reserves an award of attorney’s
fees for later determination.383 Not surprisingly, Justice Montgomery concurred in
Justice Ransom’s opinion.
In Trujillo, the Workers’ Compensation judge entered an order awarding
compensation, but, as in Kelly Inn, reserved until later the determination of attorney’s
fees. Trujillo did not appeal the compensation order within thirty days of its entry.
Instead, she waited until the trial court entered the order setting attorney’s fees, after
which she filed a timely notice of appeal from the order affirming attorney’s fees.
The court of appeals dismissed her appeal from the compensation order as untimely
because Kelly Inn held that a judgment determining the merits of a claim was final
and thus immediately appealable despite the pendency of a hearing to set attorney’s
fees.384
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the merits appeal. Writing for
a unanimous court that included Justice Montgomery, Justice Ransom retreated from
his forceful dissent supporting bright-line rules in Orosco,385 as well as from Justice
Montgomery’s endorsement of a bright-line rule for final judgments and decisions
in Kelly Inn.386 Instead, he endorsed and applied the ad-hoc policy-oriented approach
Justice Montgomery espoused in his dissent in Lowe:387 “We now retreat from the
language in Kelly Inn that suggested a bright-line rule for notices of appeal in cases
involving attorney’s fees.”388 Justice Ransom ruled, “In the twilight of marginal
cases, the zone of appeal should be one of practical choice and not one of procedural
danger.”389 “[W]hen the policies of facilitating meaningful appellate review and
achieving judicial efficiency outweigh the policy against piecemeal appeals,” he

or declining to grant a protective order limiting discovery orders. But see Breen v. State Tax’n & Revenue
Dep’t, 2012-NMCA-101, 287 P.3d 379 (permitting use of the collateral order doctrine to review a
discovery order where no other means of appeal were available).
381. State v. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 35, 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146.
382. 1993-NMSC-017, 115 N.M. 397, 851 P.2d 1064.
383. Id. ¶ 5, 851 P.2d at 1065.
384. Id. ¶ 1, 851 P.2d at 1064; see Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 21, 113
N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033.
385. Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, ¶ 36, 833 P.2d at 1154 (Ransom, C.J., specially concurring).
386. Kelly Inn, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 21, 824 P.2d at 1040.
387. Lowe v. Bloom, 1990-NMSC-069, ¶ 13, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156 (Montgomery, J.,
dissenting)
388. Trujillo, 1993-NMSC-017, ¶ 5, 851 P.2d at 1065.
389. Id.
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declared, an appellate court should accept the appeal of the merits whether timely
filed after the merits judgment was entered or after attorney’s fees were assessed.390
Thus, in Trujillo, the two Justices were able to join in a single opinion but
only because each endorsed principles held by the other. Justice Ransom suppressed
his preference for bright-line rules and adopted Justice Montgomery’s policy-based
analysis in its place. In turn, by concurring in Justice Ransom’s opinion, Justice
Montgomery abandoned his brief foray into bright-line rules in Kelly Inn, and in the
process, participated in functionally overruling his holding in Kelly Inn.
j.

Trujillo v. Serrano (The Court’s Synthesis of Ransom and Montgomery’s
Views)

The cases reviewed so far reflect attempts by Justices Ransom and
Montgomery to steer among three sources for determining the appellate jurisdiction
of New Mexico courts: The constitution, which delegates to the legislature the power
to determine jurisdiction;391 statutes passed pursuant to this authority that sets the
jurisdiction of the courts;392 and Supreme Court Rules that can supersede statutory
provisions intended not as jurisdictional limits but merely procedures for perfecting
the appeal.393
Trujillo v. Serrano394 provides the path for navigating among those
provisions. Justice Frost wrote the opinion for a unanimous three-judge court which
included Justice Montgomery.395 Trujillo sued Serrano in magistrate court
concerning a contract dispute. Both parties were pro se. At the culmination of the
trial, the magistrate judge announced he would take the case under advisement. He
apparently stated he would call the parties back to court to announce his decision.396
Instead, on March 30, he entered a final judgment in favor of Trujillo without
notifying the parties to appear to hear his ruling. Serrano claimed he only received
notice of entry of judgment by mail in May. He filed a notice of appeal on May 7.
Trujillo filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for untimeliness, noting the
applicable statute required notice of appeal be filed within fifteen days after the
judgment is rendered.397 After a hearing, the district court concluded that the
untimely notice of appeal constituted a jurisdictional defect that compelled dismissal
of the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed.

390. Id. ¶ 4, 851 P.2d at 1065. The case might have been resolved by applying the rule in Govich, that
a second notice of appeal that was timely would suffice to bring the issue of the first order (that was not
appealed) to the appellate court if the intent to appeal both orders was apparent. Govich v. N. Am. Sys.,
Inc., 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 13, 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94.
391. E.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 29.
392. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-8 (1983).
393. E.g., Rule 12-101(A).
394. 1994-NMSC-024, 117 N.M. 273, 871 P.2d 369.
395. The panel included Justice Montgomery but not Justice Ransom.
396. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 871 P.2d at 371 (Affidavit of Defendant Serrano).
397. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-1 (1975) (A party may appeal “within fifteen days after judgment is
rendered or the final order is issued in the magistrate court.”).

Summer 2022 A MODEL OF COLLEGIAL JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

481

Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution required the legislature to create
magistrate courts.398 Article VI, Section 29 provides that “Appeals shall be allowed
in all cases from the final judgments and decisions of . . . inferior courts as provided
by law.”399 This command that the legislature determine the jurisdiction of a court to
hear appeals from magistrate courts has two constitutional limitations: First, Section
27 authorizes the legislature to provide for appeals from final judgments.400 Second,
the legislature must provide an appeal from magistrate court consistent with the
litigants’ constitutional right to appeal.401
Acting within the constitutional parameters, the legislature has provided an
aggrieved party may appeal to the district court “any judgment rendered or final order
issued by the magistrate court . . . within fifteen days after judgment is rendered or
final order is issued.”402 That statute acknowledges the constitutional limit to
judgments and final orders but adds a requirement that the appeal must occur within
fifteen days after the court renders the judgment or final order. The statute provides
no details about how the appealing party must present the appeal to the district
court.403
The Supreme Court adopted Rule 2-705, which deals with appeals from
magistrate court to the district court. At the time of the Serrano appeal, it provided
the appeal must occur within “fifteen (15) days after entry of the judgment or final
order.”404 The Rule now also provides procedures for perfecting the appeal,
including the content and service of the notice of appeal that are not provided in the
statute.405 Though Rule 2-104(B) authorized the magistrate court to extend many
time provisions in the Rules, it then barred the court from extending “the time for
. . . taking an appeal under Rule 2-705.”406 This exception was consistent with the
view that the statutory fifteen-day time limit for appealing constitutes a jurisdictional
requirement that is beyond the Court’s power to modify by adopting a different
Rule.407
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Frost, ruled that the
district court judge erred when he concluded that he lacked power to extend the time
for appeal, even if the late filing resulted from the magistrate judge’s failure to call
the parties to the court to announce his decision. Rules should be construed liberally,
398. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 26 (“The legislature shall establish a magistrate court to exercise limited
original jurisdiction as may be provided by law.”).
399. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 27.
400. Id.
401. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
402. § 35-13-1.
403. See id.
404. Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 6, 117 N.M. 273, 871 P.2d 369 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Rule 2-705(A) NMRA (1992)). While the case was pending on appeal, the Court modified the
Rule to provide that the appeal must occur within fifteen days “after the judgment or final order appealed
from is filed in the magistrate court clerk’s office.” Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 7, 871 P.2d at 372
(quoting Rule 2-705(A) NMRA (1993)). That language is in the current Rule 2-705(A) NMRA.
405. Id. 2-705(A)–(C).
406. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 6, 871 P.2d at 371 (quoting Rule 2-104(B)(2) NMRA (1990)).
407. The current Rule provides that “A court shall not extend the time . . . for taking an appeal under
Rule 2-705 NMRA, except to the extent and under the circumstances stated in [Rule 2-705].” Rule 2-104
(B)(2) NMRA.
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the Court stated, so that appeals “may be determined on the merits, where it can be
done without impeding or confusing administration or perpetuating injustice.”408
The Court conceded that older New Mexico precedent held that timely
filing of an appeal was a jurisdictional defect that compelled dismissal of the
appeal.409 But more recent cases, containing opinions by Justices Ransom and
Montgomery,410 “have intimated and even proclaimed that the word ‘jurisdiction’
connotes shades of meaning in addition to its common usage.”411 Influenced by
Justice Montgomery’s “persuasive arguments against the inflexible enforcement of
jurisdictional prerequisites,”412 the Court concluded that late filing of the notice of
appeal has not inevitably resulted in dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.413
Instead, the Court embraced Justice Ransom’s categorization of “mandatory
preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction” in place of “jurisdictional requirements”
as better terminology for labelling “equivocal jurisdictional matters,” such as filing
a late notice of appeal.414 Since prior decisions had transformed the statutory time
limit for filing a notice of appeal from a jurisdictional requirement into a mandatory
precondition to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,415 the Court was able to
proclaim, “Because a mandatory precondition rather than an absolute jurisdictional
requirement is at issue, a trial court may—under unusual circumstances—use its
discretion and entertain an appeal even though it is not timely filed.”416
The Court stated that exceptions to the timeliness requirement would be
determined on a case-by-case basis,417 in which the constitutional right to an appeal
must be balanced against the need for efficient administration of justice.418 At one
point, the Court implied that the balance should tip toward forgiving non-compliance
with the time requirement for filing an appeal.419 Justice Frost, however, also
signaled a presumption that tilts the balance toward strictly limiting the occasions
when extensions will be granted: The administration of justice requires “the parties
to strictly adhere to our clearly articulated rules of procedure . . . [o]nly the most
unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties—such as error on the part
of the court—will warrant overlooking procedural defects.’”420
The Court reversed the dismissal of the appeal and remanded to the district
court to determine whether, as Serrano’s affidavit alleged, the magistrate judge

408. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 9, 871 P.2d at 372 (quoting Jaritas Live Stock Co. v. Spriggs 1937NMSC-094, ¶ 3, 42 N.M. 14, 74 P.2d 722).
409. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 10, 871 P.2d at 372–73.
410. Id. (citing Govich v. N. Am. Sys, Inc., 1991-NMSC-061, 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94; State v.
Orosco, 1992-NMSC-006, 113 N.M.780, 833 P.2d 1146 (Ransom, C.J., specially concurring); Lowe v.
Bloom, 1990-NMSC-069, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156 (Montgomery, J., dissenting)).
411. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 10, 871 P.2d at 373.
412. Id. ¶ 13, 871 P.2d at 373.
413. See id. ¶ 12, 871 P.2d at 373.
414. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 871 P.2d at 373.
415. Many of which, of course, were authored by Justices Ransom and Montgomery.
416. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 15, 871 P.2d at 374.
417. Id.
418. Id. ¶ 9, 871 P.2d at 372.
419. Id. ¶ 15, 871 P.2d at 374 (“The decision to dismiss an appeal is extreme . . . .”).
420. Id. ¶ 19, 871 P.2d at 374.
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informed Serrano that no judgment would be entered until the judge summoned the
parties to court to hear the ruling. If so, the appeal would be heard.
The Court now seems to look in two directions: first, calling for case-bycase analysis with the balance tipping toward forgiving non-compliance with the
time requirement for filing appeals, thus fostering resolving appeals on the merits—
consistent with Justice Montgomery’s position; second, understanding that strict
adherence should be given to “clearly articulated rules of procedure” which will be
overlooked only in “the most unusual circumstances,” which is consistent with the
views of Justice Ransom.421
3.

Summary of Appellate Jurisdiction

As explained previously,422 the drafters of the constitutional amendments to
the Judicial Article in the 1960s that addressed appellate jurisdiction, (including the
creation of the court of appeals) debated only two possibilities—either appellate
jurisdiction authority would be given to the legislature or the Court.423 The final
resolution in the 1965 amendments opted to leave that authority with the
legislature,424 where it had resided in the constitution of 1911.425
The cases in this section demonstrate how Justices Ransom and
Montgomery and their colleagues crafted an approach between the stark choices
presented to the constitutional drafters in 1965, transforming statutes written to fulfill
the legislature’s constitutional obligation to determine appellate jurisdiction into
statutes mostly containing only procedural prerequisites to appeal. The RansomMontgomery Court emphasized that the same constitutional provision delegating
authority to the legislature to determine the jurisdiction of the appellate courts
tempered that authority by insisting that aggrieved parties “shall have an absolute
right to one appeal.”426 Ruling that the protection of the constitutional right to appeal
properly is a guiding principle in construing those statutes, the Court perceived many
statutory provisions not as barriers to appeals but as mere guidance to litigants who
seek to exercise their right to appeal. The Court exercised its authority,

421. Cases decided after Serrano continue to grapple with the tension between the goal of fostering
the right to appeal and the competing value of fostering adherence to procedural Rules. For example, in
Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep’t, Justice Maes ruled that the court of appeals abused
its discretion in failing to excuse the late filing of notice of appeal due to an unanticipated mailing delay
that was outside the control of the appealing party. 2010-NMSC-034, ¶ 25, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259.
Justice Chavez disagreed. Id. ¶ 27, 242 P.3d at 266. He emphasized that liberal exceptions to the time of
filing requirement must not undercut the goal of strict compliance with procedural requirements. Id. ¶ 36,
242 P.3d at 268 (Chavez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also, Forsythe v. Ford Motor
Co., No. S-1-SC 37761, S-1-SC 37762, 2020 WL 6611059, at *3 (N.M. Nov. 12, 2020) (unreported
opinion) (allowing late notice of appeal where counsel erred in calendaring the date the notice of appeal
was due).
Nonetheless, the vast majority of subsequently-decided court of appeals opinions on the subject
have declined to grant waivers of the time requirements for filing the notice of appeal. A list of more than
50 such unreported memorandum opinions is on file with the New Mexico Law Review.
422. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 196 and accompanying text and N.M. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 27.
425. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1911).
426. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2.
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acknowledged by the legislature in 1933,427 to supersede portions of those statutes
by adoption of a contrary Rule and empowered the courts to excuse non-compliance
of such statutory provisions.
There remain a few vestiges of jurisdictional requirements rooted in the
statutes the legislature adopted pursuant to its constitutional prerogative to determine
appellate jurisdiction. For example, in Kelly Inn, Justice Montgomery identified the
“final judgment or decision” requirement in statutes as having continuing
jurisdictional significance.428 Also, statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals may
have continuing jurisdictional significance,429 and the provision limiting the
constitutional right to an appeal to “aggrieved parties” is of jurisdictional
significance, requiring a determination of who is an aggrieved party.430
Justices Ransom and Montgomery’s interpretive efforts provided the Court
the means for assuring that the right to appeal need not be forfeited because of
technical violations of statutory provisions for perfecting appeals. Their efforts also
provided the Court flexibility to modify procedural “housekeeping rules” that the
legislature adopted “to assist the courts with the management of their cases” when
the Court concludes that different procedures are needed in light of changed
circumstances.431
Justices Ransom and Montgomery did not proceed in a straight line in
advancing the transformation of arguably jurisdictional statutes into malleable
procedural provisions subject to the Court’s power to supersede by contrary Rule
and the courts’ authority to forgive non-compliance. Their views initially differed,
but largely coalesced as they worked together to develop a coherent approach to
adjusting the relationship of the constitutional authority of the legislature to
determine appellate jurisdiction, the constitutional right to an appeal, and the Court’s
inherent power to promulgate procedural Rules. This evolution of New Mexico law
largely resulted from the synergy produced when these two distinguished judges

427. See Act of Mar. 13, 1933, ch. 84, 1933 N.M. Laws 148. The Act provided that all existing
procedural statutes “shall, from and after the passage of this Act, have force and effect only as rules of
court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules promulgated pursuant” to
the statute. For further discussion of the import of the 1933 Act, see Michael B. Browde & Mario E.
Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for
Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 407, 425–27 (1985).
428. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, ¶ 10, n.7, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033
(quoting In re Quintana, 1971-NMSC-070, 82 N.M. 698, 487 P.2d 126 (1971) (“appellate court has
no jurisdiction to review judgment which is not final”). Even here, Justice Montgomery construed the
requirement to give the Court flexibility to define what is “final” by the creation of a “twilight zone of
finality.” Id. ¶ 15, 487 P.2d at 1038.
429. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-3 (1972) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-4 (1971). The statutes merely
provide an alternative time to exercise the constitutional right to appeal and thus are not mandated by the
constitution. The Supreme Court, however, seemingly acknowledges that requirements for interlocutory
appeals in Rule 12-203 are jurisdictional by referencing the statutes as the source of the right to seek an
interlocutory appeal and by requiring that the order authorizing an interlocutory appeal contain district
court findings required by the statute. Rule 12-203 also sets a time limit for filing an application for
interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals has noted that interlocutory appeals “are subject to allowance
only upon compliance with the [statute].” Candelaria v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1988NMCA-065, ¶ 6, 107 N.M. 579, 761 P.2d 457.
430. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
431. Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 13, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603.
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expressed their differing perspectives, respected each other, learned from one
another, and modified their positions when persuaded by the soundness of their
colleague’s reasoning.
The legislature has not objected to the gradual shift of authority to the Court
over statutory provisions for perfecting appeals. If the legislature ever disapproves
of the balance struck by the Court’s decisions, it can, of course, exercise its
constitutional authority to draft new statutes that explicitly declare what provisions
are jurisdictional, thus reversing or modifying the current model.432 That the
legislature has not seen fit to do so is perhaps the best testament to the soundness of
the approach that Justices Ransom and Montgomery forged during their tenure on
the Court.
III.

CONCLUSION

The authors began this enterprise because they knew and respected Justice
Ransom433 and Justice Montgomery434 and because they shared some expertise in the
subject matters that are the focus of this article. Michael taught classes on the New
Mexico State Constitution; Ted taught Torts and still teaches Civil Procedure.
Reviewing the justices’ decisions on the tort law of duty creation435 and the
jurisdiction of appellate courts,436 we noted a pattern in their opinions: They often
disagreed, but respectfully, and they demonstrated a willingness to learn from the
views of the other and often to modify their initial views when persuaded by the
views of their colleague.
Justice Ransom’s recent description of his relationship with Justice
Montgomery captures that relationship: Though their practice areas as lawyers
differed, this proved no barrier to their “collegial partnership [because] our mutual
respect for the other seemed to bring about harmony in any conflict.”437 And there
were obvious initial conflicts, particularly apparent in the cases addressing appellate
jurisdiction. As Justice Ransom noted, with particular reference to the appellate
jurisdiction cases: “I began by looking at the sanctity of process while he began by
looking to the sanctity of fairness in the result of the case in controversy.”438 Those
different starting points coalesced into a coherent synthesis of the law as each justice
perceived the other’s perspective and sought accommodation of their different views.
432. The legislature’s authority over appellate jurisdiction is not without limits. The doctrine of
separation of powers, see N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 1, may constrain the legislature’s exercise of its authority
to set the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Lovelace Med. Ctr., 1991-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 805 P.2d at 607.
The legislature may not encroach on the Court’s ability to effectively “administer its judicial functions,”
State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 1957-NMSC-071, ¶ 19, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223, or on the Court’s
“inherent power to promulgate rules regulating pleading, practice and procedure,” Southwest
Underwriters v. Montoya, 1969-NMSC-027, ¶ 7, 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176.
433. Both Michael and Ted had worked with Justice Ransom on a few cases before he was elevated
to the bench. After Justice Ransom’s retirement, for several years, Ted taught a law school seminar with
him, using some of the most challenging Ransom opinions for close analysis with the students.
434. Michael knew Seth Montgomery from Seth’s early days as a strong supporter of the Legal Aid
movement in New Mexico and appeared before both Justices in a few appellate cases.
435. See supra Part II(A).
436. See supra Part II(B).
437. See supra Part I(3) at 430.
438. Id.
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The justices had fewer opportunities to interact in determining the direction
of the New Mexico law of duty creation and its relationship to the other elements of
a negligence claim. The cases raising these issues during their joint tenure on the
Court were few but significant. Together they sought to update the historic Palsgraf
case to create a modern New Mexico jurisprudence of negligence law. They
disagreed on details but were moving toward a new paradigm of the law of duty that
ended prematurely with their leaving the Court before they could complete their task.
Their body of work, though, demonstrated an openness to change and served as an
encouragement to their successors who completed the project by adopting and
applying a portion of the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Edward C. and Rodriguez.
As indicated in the title of this work, and as stressed throughout the analysis
of the cases, Justices Ransom and Montgomery engaged in a collegial enterprise to
come to a common understanding of the law where they could, while maintaining
their differences where they could not—all with grace and respect for each other.
They did so publicly through concurring and dissenting opinions, which allowed the
authors to understand their differences and view the process by which they often
reached consensus.439 While the authors came to appreciate the RansomMontgomery efforts as a model of collegiality that has positive implications for many
professional enterprises, its particular value in appellate decision-making was best
expressed by two former appellate judges who reviewed an earlier draft. One noted:
“[T]his is an important piece of work . . . for the underlying lesson to appellate judges
and others: the value of dialogue and engagement with each other. That is my biggest
take away, making me realize my own shortcomings in that regard.”
And with respect to the negligence discussion, that reviewer stressed:
It is not an overstatement to say that Rodriguez would not have
happened without their collaborative work. . . . [T]he coming
together of their thoughtful, creative, and cooperative minds—and
their willingness to engage with each other—informed subsequent
generations of New Mexico jurists who continued the age old
debate begun in Palsgraf and ending—at least for now—in
Rodriguez. That partnership should be a model for others to
emulate.
The other commentator opined:

439. Many appellate judges have rightly warned against injudicious use of concurring and dissenting
opinions and stress the value of internal memos shared with all members of the court, to work out
differences. Indeed, Justice Charles Daniels who was well known for his distaste for dissents made clear
in State v. Gutierrez, 2021-NMSC-008, ¶¶ 105–08, 482 P.3d 700 (Daniels, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)—his last opinion before his untimely death—that although he agreed with the
majority’s attempt to abolish the spousal communications privilege, he must dissent only because such “a
significant change . . . should be handled through our established rules process, with input from the rules
committee, with input from the larger legal community, and with input from the state we serve.” Id. ¶ 107,
482 P.3d at 724. Justice Daniels did so, however, as was his wont “[w]ith my profound respect for my
colleagues who view the issue otherwise.” Id. ¶ 108, 482 P.3d at 724. His view and that of his dissenting
colleague, Justice Barbara Vigil ultimately prevailed when the Court subsequently granted an Order on
Rehearing. Id. ¶¶ 109–13, 482 P.3d at 724–25.
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[T]his law review article could be suggested reading for appellate
judges who are new to the bench . . . and even for lawyers or trial
judges who aspire to become appellate judges. It is an example of
how two attorneys with different professional backgrounds . . .
both with no prior judicial experience (maybe even different
political affiliations) can become effective appellate judges by
willingly sharing their different perspectives and approaches to the
law in collegially drafted dissents or special concurrences.
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